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Developments in Administrative Law: 
The 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 Terms 
Laverne Jacobs* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 terms, the Supreme Court of Canada 
was called upon to decide many complex issues that not only developed 
the jurisprudence in administrative law but furthered simultaneously 
principles of methodology and substance in other areas of law, particularly 
human rights.1  
Fleshing out the appropriate relationship between judicial review on 
administrative and constitutional law grounds was a dominant preoccupation 
of the Court in the 2005-2006 term. The relationship between constitutional 
and administrative law principles was revisited in the 2006 decision of 
Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys,2 shedding new 
light on continuing debates. Multani dealt with the appropriate methodology 
to be used when a decision made by an administrative body may violate 
Charter rights.3  
After a very intense term examining questions of exclusive and 
concurrent jurisdiction in 2004-2005, the Supreme Court of Canada 
continued its discussions in two decisions dealing with jurisdiction in 
the 2005-2006 term: Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability 
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1
 Two such cases in this regard are Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. Via Rail 
Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 15, 2007 SCC 15; and McGill University Health Centre (Montreal 
General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal, [2007] S.C.J. No. 4, 
[2007] 1 S.C.R. 161. 
2
 [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 [hereinafter “Multani”]. 
3
 In 2007, Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, 2007 
SCC 9 [hereinafter “Charkaoui”], provided perspective on the relationship between constitutional 
and administrative law from another angle. Through an analysis of whether s. 7 Charter relief could 
be gained for ex parte review of certificates of admissibility on grounds of national security (and an 
ultimate holding that such relief was warranted), the Supreme Court provided precision on the 
concept of “fundamental justice” in an administrative (immigration) context. Charkaoui is not 
discussed in the present article. It is examined in the article on constitutional law developments by 
C. Mathen and M. Plaxton in this volume. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301787
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Support Program);4 and Bisaillon v. Concordia University.5 In 
Tranchemontagne, the Court formulated some guiding principles on the 
method for deciding between concurrent administrative decision-making 
fora. The issue in Tranchemontagne was who, between a human rights 
tribunal and a social benefits tribunal, should have jurisdiction to decide 
whether a legislative provision complies with the provincial human rights 
code. Concordia University pushed further the question of exclusive 
jurisdiction that had plagued the Court in the 2004-2005 term, this time 
with respect to whether the Québec Superior Court should exercise its 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear a potential labour class action suit. 
Standard of review was the third major issue addressed by the Court. 
In the 2006-2007 term, two important cases were decided: Lévis (City) 
v. Fraternité des policiers de Lévis Inc.;6 and Council of Canadians with 
Disabilities v. Via Rail Canada Inc.7 Each addressed the issue of when 
multiple standards of review versus one standard should apply to an 
administrative decision. 
Overall, the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 terms were periods in which 
the Court opened debates that had deeply entrenched and often tangled 
roots in its administrative law jurisprudence. This article examines these 
three major issues addressed by the Court in the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 
terms — namely: (1) the relationship between administrative law review 
and review under the Charter; (2) exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction; and 
(3) standard of review.8 Through this article, the new points of guidance 
                                                                                                            
4
 [2006] S.C.J. No. 14, 2006 SCC 14 [hereinafter “Tranchemontagne”]. 
5
 [2006] S.C.J. No. 19, 2006 SCC 19 [hereinafter “Concordia University”]. 
6
 [2007] S.C.J. No. 14, 2007 SCC 14 [hereinafter “City of Lévis”]. 
7
 [2007] S.C.J. No. 15, 2007 SCC 15 [hereinafter “Via Rail”]. 
8
 Additional cases decided in the two terms are as follows: in the 2005-2006 term: Zenner 
v. Prince Edward Island College of Optometrists, [2005] S.C.J. No. 80, 2005 SCC 77, dealing with 
standard of review; May v. Ferndale Institution, [2005] S.C.J. No. 84, 2005 SCC 82, a particularly 
interesting case showing the value of the prerogative writs and a renewed interest in them; Canada 
(Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Airlines International Ltd., [2006] S.C.J. No. 1, 2006 
SCC 1, dealing with statutory interpretation and the interplay between the Canadian Human Rights 
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 and its guidelines; Isidore Garon ltée v. Tremblay; Fillion et Frères (1976) 
inc. v. Syndicat national des employés de garage du Québec inc., [2006] S.C.J. No. 3, 2006 SCC 2, 
which dealt with the issue of whether a labour arbitrator has jurisdiction to determine if a notice of 
termination of employment complies with minimum statutory employment standards under the Civil 
Code of Québec; ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), [2006] S.C.J. 
No. 4, 2006 SCC 4, which dealt with the sale of property by a tribunal; and Goodis v. Ontario 
(Ministry of Correctional Services), [2006] S.C.J. No. 31, dealing with access to government 
information, and the exemption for solicitor-client privilege. Two municipal law cases were also 
decided in the 2005-2006 Supreme Court term: Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., [2005] 
S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141, dealing with the validity of a municipal by-law and whether 
this by-law infringed Charter guarantee of freedom of expression; and Charlebois v. Saint John 
(2007), 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 57 
provided by the Court will be reviewed and the ways in which these 
current cases further the principles of past administrative law jurisprudence 
will be discussed. 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW AND 
REVIEW UNDER THE CHARTER 
1. Introduction: Revisiting the Foundational Cases of Slaight 
Communications and Ross 
Multani is a decision that deals with the appropriate methodology 
for judicial review of an administrative body’s decision when that decision 
allegedly violates constitutional or quasi-constitutional rights. The central 
debate in Multani concerns the relationship between administrative and 
constitutional law approaches to judicial review when an exercise of 
administrative discretion affects Charter rights and freedoms. This debate 
first surfaced in 1989 with the Supreme Court of Canada decision  
in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson.9 Although the concerns 
underlying it have deep consequences on more than one level — i.e., for 
administrative and constitutional law theory and, more importantly, for 
the individuals whose constitutional rights and freedoms may be affected, 
this debate has remained unresolved in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In 
order to situate the issues in Multani within their theoretical framework, 
it is useful to briefly set out four decisions that provide the context for 
these concerns over judicial review methodology. These cases are: Slaight 
Communications; Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15;10 Trinity 
Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers;11 and 
Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36.12 
                                                                                                            
(City), [2005] S.C.J. No. 77, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 563, dealing with these invisible law cases are examined 
in detail by Jerry V. DeMarco in “Developments in Environmental and Municipal Law”: The 2005-2006 
Term (2006) 35 S.C.L.R. (2d) 275. In the 2006-2007 Supreme Court term, there were two additional 
cases of an administrative law nature: McGill University Health Centre (Montréal General Hospital) 
v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal, [2007] S.C.J. No. 4, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 161, 
dealing with the extent to which collective agreements should be used to determine an employer’s 
duty to accommodate; and London (City) v. RSJ Holdings Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 29, 2007 SCC 29, 
a municipal law case dealing with transparency and its full process, which is discussed in detail by 
Jerry V. DeMarco, “Developments in Municipal Law: The 2006-2007 Term” of this volume at 498-507. 
9
 [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 [hereinafter “Slaight Communications”]. 
10
 [1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 [hereinafter “Ross”]. 
11
 [2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 [hereinafter “Trinity Western”]. 
12
 [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 [hereinafter “Chamberlain”]. 
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In Slaight Communications, a labour arbitrator determined that an 
employee of a radio station had been wrongfully dismissed.13 As part of 
a discretionary remedy, the arbitrator ordered the employer to write a 
reference letter and he specified the content. He also ordered the employer 
to respond to inquiries about the employee uniquely with this letter. Among 
the pieces of information that the arbitrator had directed to the employer 
to include in the letter were the employee’s sales performance results, 
the degree to which he had met or surpassed his quotas and the fact that 
an adjudicator had found his determination to be an unjust dismissal. The 
employer sought judicial review, arguing that the letter infringed its 
freedom of expression guaranteed under the Canadian Charter.  
At the Supreme Court, given the relative newness of the Charter at 
the time, a question arose as to the relationship between administrative 
law review and review under the Charter. The majority of the Court 
agreed with the approach taken by Lamer J. in his minority concurring 
decision. Justice Lamer first examined the arbitrator’s two orders to  
see whether they fell outside of the jurisdiction granted to him by the 
enabling statute. He found one order to be outside of the arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction and therefore, patently unreasonable (using the terminology 
and understandings of that time); the other was within the arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction and therefore not unreasonable. Having completed the 
administrative law component of his review, Lamer J. continued by 
subjecting the order that he found to be reasonable on administrative 
law grounds (i.e., that had been decided within the arbitrator’s statutory 
jurisdiction) to an analysis under the Charter. The order that he found to 
be unreasonable was simply set aside.  
Slaight Communications offers two elements to the debate over how 
to review alleged Charter violations that occur with an administrative 
context. It provided the methodology that was used by Lamer C.J. — i.e., 
to begin with an administrative law review, applying a Charter justification 
analysis to any parts of the administrative decision that still remained 
valid. In addition, Dickson C.J. offered his general prediction that the 
“precise relationship between the traditional standard administrative law 
review of patent unreasonableness and new constitutional standard of 
review will be worked out in future cases”.14 
                                                                                                            
13
 Slaight Communications is discussed in J.M. Evans, “Developments in Administrative 
Law: The 1988-89 Term” (1990) 1 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1, at 24-34. 
14
 See Slaight Communications, supra, note 9, at para. 11. 
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Decided in 1996, Ross essentially adopted the approach used in Slaight 
Communications. However, it added some precision to the way that the 
administrative law and constitutional law standards were to be applied. 
In Ross, the Court held that the two standards were not to be collapsed 
into one. If Charter values were invoked by the decision under review, the 
section 1 analysis was the more appropriate analysis to use. Administrative 
law review was only necessary if no Charter values were at play. 
Moreover, the Court in Ross asserted that if an administrative decision 
could withstand the section 1 analysis then it was unlikely that it would 
also be found to be patently unreasonable on administrative law grounds. 
Conversely, an administrative law decision found to be unconstitutional 
under section 1 analysis would not need to be subjected to administrative 
law review — there is no question that an unconstitutional decision exceeds 
the jurisdiction of any administrative decision-maker. Interestingly, despite 
the fact that the standard of review jurisprudence had progressed, by the 
time Ross was decided,15 still only the standard of patent unreasonableness 
was incorporated into the test. 
Finally, Chamberlain and Trinity Western are two recent cases in 
which an administrative decision engaged Charter values, although not 
necessarily the Charter itself. In both cases, the Supreme Court reviewed 
the decision using solely an administrative law approach. In Multani, the 
question of the appropriate way to engage administrative and constitutional 
review was once again addressed — this time against the backdrop of 
the evolution of the administrative law standard of review jurisprudence. 
2. Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys 
In Multani, a Sikh student alleged that his freedom of religion, 
guaranteed by sections 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights  
and Freedoms16 and section 3 of Québec’s Charter of human rights and 
freedoms,17 had been infringed by the decision of a school board 
commission. The school board commission rendered its decision further 
to the discretion granted to it under the Education Act.18 A central question 
                                                                                                            
15
 See notably, Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] S.C.J. No. 58, 
[1994]  2 S.C.R. 557. 
16
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
17
 R.S.Q. c. C-12 [hereinafter “Québec Charter”]. 
18
 R.S.Q. c. I-13.3, ss. 12, 76. 
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at issue in Multani was whether the decision should be reviewed using 
constitutional or administrative law principles.19 
Gurbaj Singh Multani was an orthodox Sikh who wore a kirpan,  
a small religious object made of metal that is shaped like a dagger and is 
worn under clothing. In November 2001, Gurbaj Singh accidentally dropped 
his kirpan in the schoolyard. The school board sent his parents a letter 
which authorized their son to wear his kirpan to school provided that  
he comply with certain conditions to ensure that it was sealed inside  
his clothing. The school board considered this to be a reasonable 
accommodation. Gurbaj Singh and his parents agreed to the conditions. 
The school’s governing board, however, refused to ratify the agreement. 
They found that wearing a kirpan violated the school’s code of conduct 
as it prohibited weapons and dangerous objects from the school. Upon 
appeal by the Multanis to the school board’s council of commissioners 
(the “council”), the council upheld the decision of the governing board. The 
council was prepared to permit the wearing of a symbolic kirpan in the 
form of a pendant or in another form, provided that it was made of a 
material that rendered it harmless. 
Gurbaj Singh’s father sought a declaratory judgment and interlocutory 
injunction in the Québec Superior Court. His motion asked the court to 
declare the council’s decision of no force or effect and to declare that 
Gurbaj Singh had a right to wear his kirpan to school if sealed and sewn 
up in his clothes. He argued that wearing the kirpan in such a way 
represented a reasonable accommodation of his son’s religious freedom 
and equality rights. An interlocutory injunction was granted which 
authorized Gurbaj Singh to wear his kirpan provided that he comply 
with the conditions initially set by the school board until a final decision 
was rendered in the case. Ultimately, the Superior Court declared the 
council’s decision null and of no force or effect and authorized Gurbaj 
Singh’s right to wear his kirpan under certain conditions. The Québec 
Court of Appeal reversed this decision.20 Gurbaj Singh Multani’s father 
                                                                                                            
19
 The majority concurring judges framed the standard of review question as a preliminary 
issue. See Multani, supra, note 2, at paras. 15ff.  
20
 See Québec (Procureur-général) v. Singh (Multani), [2004] Q.J. No. 1904 (C.A.). 
The Québec Court of Appeal reasoned that the kirpan was, in essence, a dagger and as such, was an 
inherently dangerous object. The Court held (at paras. 87 and 89) that while banning any object 
capable of causing harm would be unreasonable, it was within reasonable limits to prohibit the 
possession of an intrinsically dangerous object like the kirpan: 
This regulation from the Code of Conduct cannot go so far as to prohibit the possession 
of any object which can cause injury; indeed, even a pencil can be used to inflict injury. 
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then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court held 
that the decision of the school board had infringed Gurbaj Singh’s freedom 
of religion. Regardless of whether they opted to use the Oakes test or to 
review on administrative law grounds, no member of the Court was 
convinced that the absolute prohibition of the kirpan was necessary. The 
Court was not persuaded by the respondent’s arguments that the kirpan 
is a symbol of violence, that allowing kirpans in school would promote 
their use for violence and undermine the goal of safety in schools, or 
that allowing Sikh students to wear kirpans would lead to perceptions of 
a double standard. The Court of Appeal decision was therefore set aside 
and the council’s decision was declared to be null.  
The Court’s decision presents three concurring sets of reasons with 
strong points of divergence. The primary point of disagreement dealt 
with the correct way to view the matter: as a constitutional question with 
administrative law aspects or as an administrative action that may have 
violated a constitutional right. Overall, the discussion between the majority 
and minority judges revisits and develops the jurisprudential debate started 
earlier with Slaight Communications over the control of administrative 
discretion when that exercise of discretion affects Charter rights and 
freedoms. This important aspect of administrative law had not been 
addressed since Slaight Communications and Ross. The plurality of views 
presented by the Court shows that this issue is one fraught with difficulty, 
especially in light of the evolution of the administrative law jurisprudence 
that had occurred in the interim.  
(a) Majority Concurring Reasons: Chief Justice McLachlin and 
Bastarache, Binnie, Fish and Charron JJ. 
The majority began by discussing whether a standard of review 
analysis should apply to the review of a constitutional question that arises 
within an administrative decision-making context. The issue of standard 
of review had been raised for the first time at the Court of Appeal which 
had held that the appropriate standard was reasonableness simpliciter. 
                                                                                                            
Nevertheless, a reasonable line must be drawn, and an inherently dangerous object falls 
beyond that line.  
Stripped of its symbolic religious significance, the kirpan has all of the physical 
characteristics of an edged weapon... .  
The Court relied on Nijjar v. Canada 3000 Airlines Ltd., [1999] C.H.R.D. No. 3, No. T.D. 3/99 
and R. v. Hothi, [1985] M.J. No. 318, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 31, affd [1986] 3 W.W.R. 671 (C.A.), leave to 
appeal to S.C.C refused (1986), 70 N.R. 397n (S.CC.), where kirpans had been banned from airplanes 
and courtrooms respectively, in support of its decision. 
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The Court of Appeal’s standard of review analysis sought to find an 
appropriate medium between the two ways of viewing the case before it. 
Multani presented a strong human rights element as well as concern 
regarding the regulation of the school environment, including safety within 
the school. Considering the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence 
holding that less deference should be owed to administrative bodies 
determining human rights questions because of the comparable, if not 
greater, expertise in human rights possessed by the courts, and keeping 
an ear tuned to decisions such as R. v. M. (M.R.),21 which emphasized 
the experience and knowledge of school authorities not shared by the 
courts, the Quebec Court of Appeal found that reasonableness simpliciter 
struck a correct balance between judicial intervention and restraint. 
Reasonableness simpliciter was also the standard adopted by the majority 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Chamberlain — a school board case 
that similarly involved a human rights dimension.22  
At the Supreme Court, the majority concurring opinion held that  
the administrative law standard of review was not applicable at all. The 
majority asserted that a section 1 analysis is the only test for determining 
if an infringement of protected rights is constitutional. Justice Charron’s 
reasons for preferring a constitutional justification analysis were anchored 
on three main points. First, she reasoned that using administrative law 
standards could, at the very least, cause confusion between constitutional 
and administrative law principles. At worst, they could reduce fundamental 
rights and freedoms to mere administrative law principles. Referring  
to Dickson C.J. in Slaight Communications, Charron J. asserted that 
constitutional justification offered a more sophisticated and structured 
analysis that was preferable to the inadequacy of the standard of review 
analysis. 
Justice Charron’s second main reason centred on the insignificance 
of “validity” to the current decision. From a reading of her reasons, it is 
clear that “validity” is a term that refers solely to whether the council had 
made its decision within the jurisdiction given to it by statute.23 Justice 
Charron pointed out that the validity of the rule against weapons that the 
school board had adopted had not been challenged at all. The complaint 
                                                                                                            
21
 [1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393 [hereinafter “M. (M.R.)”]. 
22
 Although in Chamberlain, supra, note 12, while Charter values were at play, the Court 
was not asked to determine if the school board had complied with the Charter itself. 
23
 This is discussed below.  
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was based entirely on the potential violation of a constitutional freedom. 
An administrative law analysis was therefore inapropriate. 
Finally, without much discussion of this point, Charron J. asserted 
that the standard of review was irrelevant because it had been established 
in Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin24 that the 
correctness standard would always apply in the judicial review of  
an administrative decision that was “based on the application and 
interpretation of the Canadian Charter”.25 The implication here seems to 
be that, ultimately, under the correctness test, the Court’s decision based 
on a section 1 analysis could replace that of the school board council. 
Spending time determining the appropriate standard of review was 
therefore unnecessary. 
(b) Minority Concurring Reasons: Justices Deschamps and Abella 
In contrast to the majority, Deschamps and Abella JJ. were of the 
opinion that the analysis of the issues in Multani should be completed 
within the framework of an administrative law review. Determining the 
standard of review was therefore an essential first step. Justices Deschamps 
and Abella provided two major reasons in support of this opinion. Their 
first argument was based on a distinction between a “norm” and a 
“decision”. The characteristic of a norm is that it is a principle or rule of 
general application such as those created by a legislature through statutes 
or delegated legislation; by contrast, a decision is generally understood 
to be the result of the application of a norm to a particular set of facts.26 
They asserted that constitutional justification had been designed to analyze 
the validity or enforceability of norms only. When it comes to assessing the 
validity of an administrative decision, the constitutional justification 
analysis cannot be easily transferred to administrative decisions.  
In elaborating their reasons, Deschamps and Abella JJ. developed 
these ideas. They questioned the “unified analysis” that Lamer J. had 
introduced in his minority decision in Slaight Communications. The unified 
approach proposes that an order or decision can be analyzed in the same 
way as a law and should be subject to constitutional analysis if Charter 
values are at play. Justices Deschamps and Abella noted that the case 
                                                                                                            
24
 [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 [hereinafter “Martin”] 
25
 See Multani, supra, note 2, at para. 20. 
26
 Justices Deschamps and Abella outlined most clearly the distinction between a norm and 
a decision or order in Multani, id., at para. 112. 
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law is not settled on this issue. For example, the majority in Slaight 
Communications itself may not have agreed with the unified approach, 
holding only that the appropriate relationship between administrative law 
review and constitutional review would have to be “worked out in future 
cases”.27 Moreover, in Deschamps and Abella JJ.’s view, this comment 
has been interpreted in an ambivalent fashion since that time. In Ross, 
for example, the majority’s comment in Slaight Communications was 
interpreted to favour a constitutional analysis whenever constitutional 
values are at issue, whereas in the more recent cases of Trinity Western 
and Chamberlain, the Supreme Court of Canada went the other way and 
used administrative law principles despite the fact that Charter values 
were involved. 
Beyond the unsettled nature of the jurisprudence, they also had several 
practical reasons for being wary of including administrative decisions in 
the concept of “law”. Given that section 1 uses “reasonable limits as 
prescribed by law” as the boundary to circumscribe guaranteed rights 
and freedoms, incorporating decisions which are individualized in nature 
and based on the outcome of norms applied to specific fact situations 
would prevent litigants and administrative bodies from knowing in advance 
the status of fundamental rights. Justices Deschamps and Abella pointed 
out, however, that if a norm such as the code of conduct or one of its 
provisions had been challenged, then a section 1 constitutional analysis 
would have been appropriate.28 
Moreover, including decisions within the section 1 concept of “law” 
would have implications for the role of the administrative decision-maker. 
On the one hand, an administrative body in the process of producing its 
decision would be subject to a “bifurcated obligation”. It would have to 
turn its mind to being able to justify some parts of its decision on 
administrative law principles and other parts on constitutional law 
grounds.29 On the other hand, using the section 1 analysis could introduce 
problems relating to the burden of proof. There would be problems in 
the administration of justice relating to the nature of evidence that would 
have to be adduced by administrative decision-makers in order to justify 
their decisions. Although their reasons are not entirely clear, Deschamps 
and Abella JJ. seem to be suggesting that administrative decision-makers 
                                                                                                            
27
 See Slaight Communications, supra, note 9, at para. 11. 
28
 See Multani, supra, note 2, at para. 138. 
29
 The idea of a bifurcated obligation is discussed by Deschamps and Abella JJ. in Multani, 
id., at para. 111. 
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and, in particular, those with quasi-judicial functions may need to rely 
on the government to present their positions. However, reliance on the 
government would have to be tempered by an appreciation of the tribunal’s 
role as independent of government, and the government may not, in any 
event, have all the information necessary to justify the decision made.30 
Finally, it would blur the role of the administrative decision-maker by 
forcing it to justify its decision in relation to section 1 of the Charter 
before the reviewing court. If this were done, the tribunal would 
conceptually gain an interest in the dispute before it and take on the role 
of a party to it. The roles of decision-maker or arbiter and party would 
thus become imprecise.31  
Their second major argument was that an administrative decision 
that violates the Canadian Charter would not be able to withstand judicial 
review on administrative law grounds. Justices Deschamps and Abella 
argued that the standard of review approach was demanding enough to 
render invalid any decision of an administrative body that fails to consider 
constitutional values. Since cases like Baker had held that an administrative 
law analysis incorporates Charter principles, it was unnecessary to resort 
to a constitutional justification. Overall, keeping with an administrative 
law analysis would avoid blurring the distinction between principles of 
constitutional justification and principles of administrative law and would 
keep pure the analytical tools developed for each of these fields.32 
Unlike the majority, Deschamps and Abella JJ. framed the issue in 
Multani as being whether the school board’s decision was valid in light 
of the offer of accommodation made by the father and the student.33 They 
determined that reasonableness was the appropriate standard of review. 
Applying this standard, they held that the school board did not sufficiently 
consider Gurbaj Singh’s freedom of religion or the accommodation 
measures that he and his father had proposed. Instead, the school board 
had simply applied the code of conduct literally. In so doing, the school 
board made an unreasonable decision. 
                                                                                                            
30
 See Multani, id., at para. 111. 
31
 This is discussed in Multani, id., at para. 123. 
32
 See id., at paras. 126-28, and paras. 85-86. 
33
 The issue is framed this way by Deschamps and Abella JJ. in Multani, id., at para. 92. 
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(c) Minority Concurring Reasons: Justice LeBel 
Lastly, LeBel J. in a brief, concurring decision of his own, argued 
for a much more nuanced approach to the entire debate over whether to 
use administrative or constitutional law principles of review. He agreed 
that it was better to start by attempting to solve a problem such as the 
one in Multani through the use of administrative law principles. He stated 
that it is not always necessary to resort to a Charter analysis (or analysis 
under the Québec Charter) if a decision can be reached using general 
administrative law principles or the specific rules governing the exercise 
of a delegated power. At the same time, however, he noted that a 
constitutional analysis is sometimes unavoidable due to the context of 
the dispute. 
To a certain extent, LeBel J. agreed with the analysis of Deschamps 
and Abella JJ. He thought it unquestionable that under the approach 
proposed by Deschamps and Abella JJ., the decision of the council would 
be quashed. However, he added that if the decision were quashed because 
of the violation of constitutional standard then it would become necessary 
to do a constitutional analysis to determine if the violation of the 
constitutional right or freedom was justifiable. At that stage, it is necessary 
to consider the constitutional rights in issue and how they have been 
applied. 
Ultimately, LeBel J.’s discussion suggests that while he is in favour 
of constitutional analysis in appropriate circumstances, he does not believe 
that the current section 1 justification analysis provides all that needs to 
be assessed. In particular, the current section 1 analysis does not deal 
with the content of rights or with competing rights and how they should 
be reconciled.  
Justice LeBel also expressed concern with the norm-decision dichotomy 
proposed by Deschamps and Abella JJ. He found that it would present 
many problems in application. He also indicated that he shared the same 
concerns as the majority — namely, that regardless of whether the 
infringement of rights and freedoms stems from a normative rule or from 
the application of that normative rule, the effect on the complainant is 
the same.34 From the perspective of the complainant, all that matters is 
that the violation, if there is one, be rectified. 
Overall, LeBel J.’s proposed framework maintains that it is valid to 
start with administrative law principles in order to determine whether an 
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administrative act is consistent with the powers delegated by legislation 
to the administrative body. If the act is authorized, the body’s actual 
exercise of discretion should then be assessed in light of constitutional 
guarantees and their values. However, unlike the rest of his colleagues, 
when it came to the analysis of the potential infringement of constitutional 
rights, LeBel J. turned first to the question of how to reconcile competing 
constitutional rights if a conflict exists. For this he had two possible 
approaches. The first would involve defining the rights and considering 
how they should relate to each other. The second would involve using a 
section 1 analysis to see if the infringement could be justified. As for  
the application of the Oakes test, LeBel J.’s analysis became even more 
nuanced. He opined that certain steps of the Oakes test may not be 
necessary in certain situations. For example, if the statutory authority under 
which an administrative body makes its decision has not been challenged, 
a review of the objectives of the statute would not be necessary. In such 
a situation, the elements of the Oakes test that will be used are those 
relating to proportionality, including any issues of accommodation.  
Because of the facts in Multani, LeBel J.’s first approach — namely, 
that of defining rights and their relationship was not relevant — in Multani 
there were no competing rights. Instead, his second approach — a section 1 
analysis — was used. Justice LeBel found that the school board did not 
meet its burden of proof. It had not convinced the Court that prohibiting 
Gurbaj Singh’s kirpan altogether was a reasonable limit on the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of religion. As a result, he agreed with the conclusion 
and remedy proposed by his colleagues.  
(i) Commentary 
Unquestionably, the main point preventing the majority and LeBel 
J. from agreeing with Deschamps and Abella JJ. is that the former set of 
judges were not convinced that an administrative law approach would 
provide an appropriate or effective evaluation of constitutional values. 
For Charron J. and the majority, the necessity of using a constitutional 
justification analysis arises whenever the constitutional question can be 
seen to be the “dominant” question at issue in the matter under review. 
As for LeBel J., although he agreed with the minority that starting an 
analysis with an administrative law approach was valid, he also believed 
that it was necessary to go further. Once a decision had been found to be 
invalid on administrative law grounds, it was necessary to conduct a 
constitutional analysis in order to decide if constitutional rights or freedoms 
68 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2007), 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
had been unjustifiably infringed. For LeBel J., however, the current 
constitutional justification under section 1 of the Charter did not offer a 
satisfactory tool of analysis. 
From the standpoint of administrative law theory, one wonders if it is 
possible to link the current standard of review analysis with a section 1 
justification. While this will not fully address LeBel J.’s concerns, it 
might address the concerns of Charron J. and the majority. Such a link 
could broadly be drawn through the concept of “reasonable limit” in 
section 1. A decision that is a reasonable limit imposed by law should 
not only be made within the boundaries of the deference that it is 
appropriate to show to the decision-maker but should also be valid on 
Charter grounds. A very good argument can be made that a decision 
that violates the Charter and is therefore unconstitutional should attract 
no deference whatsoever. Nevertheless, there is some merit to the idea 
of employing the checks and balances of administrative review when  
the impugned decision has been made through a process that the legislature 
has designated. Determining the appropriate standard of review will also 
help to establish the remedial route that should be taken. Administrative 
law’s remedies are not always to substitute the decision of the court but 
may be to return the matter for reconsideration by the administrative 
body. What I propose is that the section 1 constitutional justification be 
integrated more explicitly within the administrative framework of analysis.  
Similar to the approach taken by Deschamps and Abella JJ. in Multani, 
the proposed linkage would take place at the stage of applying (as opposed 
to determining) the standard of review. Each of the three standards 
could serve as a way to open the door to deciding when a constitutional 
justification analysis is needed. For example, if the standard of review is 
determined to be patent unreasonableness, then courts could determine that 
a potential Charter violation is a patent enough error to attract review. 
The review of this potential Charter violation would then be done using 
a section 1 analysis, with the result that an unjustifiable violation could 
cause the decision to be returned. As for the standard of reasonableness, 
if the reasons given in an administrative decision cannot support the 
conclusion reached (Southam) because there appears to be an infringement 
of a Charter guarantee, then a section 1 analysis can assist in determining 
whether the standard of reasonableness has been met. Clearly, an 
unjustifiable Charter infringement will render any decision unreasonable. 
Finally, correctness is perhaps the easiest standard to apply. If, based on 
a constitutional justification analysis, the decision shows an unjustifiable 
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Charter infringement, the decision can be quashed with the court substituting 
its reasons for those given by the administrative decision-maker.  
Linking Charter justification and administrative law review in this 
way not only offers the opportunity for more thorough constitutional 
review within an administrative context, it also respects the expertise 
and responsibilities that have been entrusted to administrative actors by 
the legislature. As well, the majority’s reasoning seems to have been 
motivated by the concern that administrative law principles will not yield 
as just a result as constitutional principles. Infusing the administrative 
framework with the constitutional justification analysis in cases of review 
of administrative discretion may address this. 
However, beyond the narrow perspective of administrative law 
theory lays a much more disconcerting concern: should the constitutional 
and administrative law approaches yield similar, if not the same, results? 
If the risk that the two approaches will provide such different results is 
so significant that it has caused such divides in the Court, then this 
signals a fundamental disconnect between the paths of law and justice. 
Certainly, for the average litigants such as Mr. Multani and his son, there 
is a reasonable expectation that a just result will ensue regardless of 
whether their case is presented as one of constitutional or administrative 
law. Moreover, given the greater amount of Charter responsibility given 
to tribunals as confirmed in Martin, one can envision many more 
constitutional matters coming through administrative channels. It is still 
debatable whether Martin stands for the proposition that constitutional 
questions decided by tribunals will always be decided on a correctness 
standard. It is also debatable whether the courts will continue to maintain 
three standards of review (discussed below). Nevertheless, regardless of 
these uncertainties, it would be encouraging, from the perspective of 
access to justice, to see more uniformity in the Court’s results. 
On a similar note, one cannot help but notice the comments of the 
majority on using reasonable accommodation principles developed under 
statutory human rights regimes to aid in the section 1 analysis. There is 
a rich literature on the use of Charter principles in the development of 
jurisprudence under statutory human rights regimes — much of it weaves 
a cautionary tale.35 It will be interesting to see how the inverse approach 
to human rights law cross-fertilization, started in Multani, will develop. 
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Finally, one very surprising aspect of the decision in Multani stems 
from the majority and LeBel J.’s presentation of the concept of “validity” 
in the administrative law sense. In their view, validity dealt only with 
whether or not the administrative decision-maker had made its decision 
within the boundaries of the jurisdiction set out in its constituent 
legislation.36 Often referred to as the patently unreasonable test, this 
approach of reviewing for excess of jurisdiction for various reasons 
including bad faith, deciding for improper purposes, etc. was traditionally 
used for the review of discretionary decisions.  
However, this understanding of the validity of decisions in 
administrative law has evolved considerably as part of the development 
of the standard of review jurisprudence in the past several years. Most 
notably, in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)37 
the majority of the Court made a concerted effort to have the standard of 
review for both discretionary and non-discretionary decisions decided 
by way of the pragmatic and functional approach. It is surprising that 
despite these parallel developments of the Supreme Court, the patently 
unreasonable test was the only test for validity considered by the majority 
of the Court in Multani.  
The relationship between the administrative law standard of review 
and constitutional standard of review under the Charter is an issue that 
has certainly not been settled by Multani; if anything Multani has 
introduced many more aspects of the debate that need to be confronted 
and examined critically. I have addressed a few in these comments but 
there are certainly others, such as the norm-decision dichotomy, that the 
Court will likely revisit in the future.38 
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III. EXCLUSIVE AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
During the 2004-2005 Supreme Court term, the Court’s decisions 
showed a preoccupation with questions relating to exclusive and 
concurrent jurisdiction. The Court’s primary concern at that time was to 
establish appropriate methodologies for determining the correct decision-
maker to decide a matter when more than one decision-making body 
seemed capable of receiving it. In my analysis of the 2004-2005 cases, I 
suggested there were still many unanswered questions and much room 
for development of the jurisprudence regarding exclusive and concurrent 
jurisdiction.39 It seemed almost inevitable that questions of exclusive 
and concurrent jurisdiction would continue to plague the Court. In the 
2005-2006 term, the Court had occasion to revisit and develop further 
the principles it had established earlier. Two cases dealing with jurisdiction 
were decided that term. Tranchemontagne dealt with the concept of 
concurrent jurisdiction — that is, with the question of how to decide 
which administrative decision-making body should take subject matter 
jurisdiction when more than one decision-maker can theoretically receive 
the matter and none exhibits express legislative indications of exclusivity. 
The second, Concordia University, revisited the debates surrounding 
exclusive jurisdiction and the use of the Weber test. Concordia University 
is significant because it shows two decision-making fora, each with 
elements of exclusivity, pitted against each other: labour arbitration and 
class-action proceedings of the Superior Court. 
1. Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support 
Program) 
At issue in Tranchemontagne was whether the Social Benefits Tribunal 
(“SBT”) of Ontario had jurisdiction to determine that a provision of one 
of its enabling statutes was inconsistent with the Ontario Human Rights 
Code and therefore inapplicable. In addition to questions of concurrent 
jurisdiction, Tranchemontagne also raised the question of the extent to 
which the principles in the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision of Martin, 
which allowed tribunals to decide that provisions of their enabling statutes 
were unconstitutional under the Charter and decline to apply them, could 
be extended to the realm of quasi-constitutional enactments. 
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Robert Tranchemontagne and Norman Werbeski applied for income 
support under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997 
(“ODSPA”)40 in 1998 and 1999 respectively. The ODSPA provides income 
support payments to individuals with disabilities. However, section 5(2) 
of the ODSPA precludes eligibility for support if the applicant is addicted 
to alcohol.41 At first instance, the applications of Mr. Tranchemontagne 
and Mr. Werbeski were considered by the Director of the Ontario Disability 
Support Program42 who concluded that the applicants had an addiction 
to alcohol and were therefore not eligible for income support. 
Tranchemontagne and Werbeski appealed this decision to the Social 
Benefits Tribunal. Before the tribunal, they argued that subsection 5(2) 
of the ODSPA contravened the Ontario Human Rights Code (“Code”) 43 
because alcoholism was a form of disability. They argued that subsection 
5(2) was therefore contrary to section 1 of the Code which provides that 
“every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to services, 
goods and facilities, without discrimination because of ... disability”. 
Given that subsection 47(2) of the Code indicates that the Code has 
primacy if there is a conflict between it and any other Act or regulation,44 
the applicants contended that the SBT should find that subsection 5(2) 
of the ODSPA was of no effect. The SBT did not decide the question as 
it held that it did not have jurisdiction to apply the Human Rights Code 
in a way that rendered provisions of its enabling statutes inoperable.  
On appeal to the Ontario Divisional Court, the decision of the SBT 
was upheld.45 In brief, oral reasons, the Court held that a tribunal must 
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find its jurisdiction in its enabling legislation and is limited by its 
enabling legislation. In the Court’s opinion, the two statutes specifying 
the jurisdiction of the SBT — namely, the ODSPA and the Ontario Works 
Act, 1997 (“OWA”)46 — did not grant it jurisdiction to decide the issue 
of the Code’s paramountcy. The Court maintained that while the Tribunal 
could use the Ontario Human Rights Code to interpret its legislation,  
it could not find authority in the Code to ignore its enabling legislation. 
As part of its reasons for dismissing the appeal, the Court held that there 
was no evidence indicating that the Social Benefits Tribunal had the 
expertise to address human rights issues. The Court asserted that the issue 
of whether alcoholism was a disability and whether, by virtue of the Code, 
subsection 5(2) should be held inoperable “should be determined by a 
court or other tribunal with jurisdiction, expertise and procedure sufficient 
to develop a full record and analysis to adequately address the issue”.47 
Moreover, the tribunal’s procedures did not appear to be appropriate for 
resolving such issues. 
Messrs. Werbeski and Tranchemontagne appealed to the Ontario Court 
of Appeal48 where their appeal was once again dismissed. In expansive 
reasons, the Court of Appeal offered a two-part analysis. First, the Court 
determined that the tribunal had implicit jurisdiction to decide questions 
of law and that this jurisdiction included the power to decide matters 
that fall under the Human Rights Code. In this regard, the Court of Appeal 
was extending the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Martin. 
Martin had held that tribunals with express or implied jurisdiction to decide 
questions of law also have the jurisdiction to decide Charter matters, 
unless that power has been excluded by the legislature. Interestingly, the 
Court of Appeal offered no explicit reasons to explain its application of 
the principles relating to the Charter developed in Martin to the quasi-
constitutional domain (i.e., to the Code). Second, the Court of Appeal found 
that despite the tribunal’s implied power to consider issues under the 
Code, the tribunal had acted appropriately in declining this jurisdiction. 
In the Court of Appeal’s view, the Ontario Human Rights Commission 
was a more appropriate forum for resolving the dispute. This part of the 
Court’s reasoning was based on its analysis of Quebec (Commission des 
droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Quebec (Attorney 
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General) (“Morin”)49 and Quebec (Attorney General) v. Quebec (Human 
Rights Tribunal) (“Charette”),50 two key decisions on jurisdiction that 
the Supreme Court had decided around the time of the Court of Appeal 
decision. In Morin and Charette, the Supreme Court of Canada had 
taken into consideration which tribunal was the “best fit” as part of its 
determination of which tribunal should have jurisdiction.51 In both Morin 
and Charette, a human rights tribunal was one of the bodies before 
which the litigant wished to present its complaint. Although these two 
cases differed from Tranchemontagne in that they dealt with competing 
administrative regimes where one regime had a legislative claim to 
exclusive jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal did not seem to take this into 
consideration.  
The arrival of the appeal before the Supreme Court therefore left 
one wondering about the narrow issue of whether the SBT had the power 
to consider the human rights question and whether it had the ability to 
decline its jurisdiction as the Ontario Court of Appeal had determined. 
Most importantly, however, for many seeking more concrete guidance 
for determining matters of exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction after 
the 2004-2005 term, one also wondered about the proper application,  
if any, of Morin and Charette to the present appeal, as this was the first 
time that the Supreme Court was faced with deciding which of two 
administrative bodies with concurrent jurisdiction over a matter should 
take jurisdiction (as opposed to deciding between two decision-making 
fora, where one of the two appeared to have exclusive jurisdiction).  
The majority of the Supreme Court held that the SBT had jurisdiction 
to decide the human rights matter and that it erred by not doing so. The 
case was remitted to the SBT to rule on the applicability of subsection 
5(2) of the ODSPA. The majority judges were represented by McLachlin 
C.J., Binnie, Bastarache and Fish JJ., with reasons written by Bastarache J. 
The dissenting opinion by LeBel, Deschamps and Abella JJ., was penned 
by Abella J. 
(a) The Majority 
Writing for the majority, Bastarache J. viewed the issue in 
Tranchemontagne as being whether the SBT is obligated to follow 
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provincial human rights legislation in rendering its decisions.52 He followed 
this general statement with two specific sub-issues, namely, (1) whether 
the SBT has the jurisdiction to consider the Code in rendering its decisions; 
and (2) whether, if the SBT does indeed have jurisdiction to consider the 
Code, it should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction in the present case. 
Justice Bastarache began his analysis by examining the legislation 
in question. He started with the enabling statutes of the SBT — the 
ODSPA and the OWA. Applying the principles developed in Martin, 
Bastarache J. determined that the SBT was empowered to decide questions 
of law. For Bastarache J., a main indication of this was that the ODSPA 
provides for an appeal on questions of law from the SBT to the Divisional 
Court. This power was also evident from the nature of the questions that 
the tribunal was required to determine in the course of its work, such 
as the legal meaning of the expressions “substantial physical or mental 
impairment” and “chemically active substance”. As held in Martin, if an 
administrative body is empowered to decide questions of law, there is a 
presumption that it can go beyond its enabling statute and decide issues 
of common law or statutory interpretation so long as those legal questions 
arise in the course of a case that is properly before it. Justice Bastarache 
stressed quite heavily that what the tribunal was being asked to do in 
this case was not analogous to constitutional invalidation. Constitutional 
invalidation — e.g., subjecting a provision to Charter scrutiny — requires 
a tribunal to have the power to decide questions of law in relation to the 
particular provision at issue. In this case, Bastarache J. asserted, the SBT 
was being asked merely to apply an external statute. It did not matter if its 
consideration of the external source might render a provision inapplicable. 
This distinction was central to Bastarache J.’s analysis. In Bastarache 
J.’s opinion, the necessity for a tribunal to consider external sources of 
law rests simply on the importance of well-informed decisions and the 
reality that a complete legal answer may not necessarily be found solely 
in a tribunal’s enabling statute. 
The respondent argued that the ODSPA and the OWA restricted the 
tribunal’s power to determine questions of law so that it could not 
determine matters under the Code. In particular, subsection 29(3) of the 
ODSPA prevented the tribunal from making decisions on appeal that the 
Director could not have made in the first instance. The respondent argued 
that since the Director could not possibly use the Code to deny an 
application under the ODSPA (and it is unclear how the respondent came 
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to this conclusion), the tribunal also did not have the authority to consider 
the Code. In rejecting the respondent’s argument, Bastarache J. drew a 
conceptual distinction between a “decision” and a “power” of the tribunal. 
In his view, subsection 29(3) dealt only with decisions, yet, using the Code 
to inform an eligibility determination was not a decision but simply a 
power that the tribunal may possess. Moreover, Bastarache J. observed 
that the ODSPA speaks of powers possessed by the SBT but not the 
Director. The possibility that the SBT may consider the Code was therefore 
not caught or precluded by subsection 29(3).  
The respondent argued further that subsection 67(2) of the OWA, 
which provides that the SBT cannot determine the constitutional validity 
of a provision or regulation,53 prevented the SBT from considering the 
Code. This seemed to be a stronger argument for the respondent. Justice 
Bastarache interpreted the respondent’s argument as premised on the 
idea that the scrutiny required to determine if a provision is discriminatory 
and therefore inapplicable under the Code is analogous to the kind of 
scrutiny required to examine the constitutional validity of a provision. 
However, he did not find this analogy tenable. 
Justice Bastarache observed that the primacy provision of the Code 
has both similarities and differences to section 52 of the Constitution. 
Both serve to eliminate the effects of inconsistent legislation with the 
result that the impugned provision will not be followed and, for the 
purposes of that particular application, it is as if the legislation had never 
been in effect. Yet, Bastarache J. found that differences between the 
primacy provisions of the Code and the Constitution were far more 
important than the similarities. As Bastarache J. put it: 
... it is one thing to preclude a statutory tribunal from invalidating 
legislation enacted by the legislature that created it. It is completely 
different to preclude that body from applying legislation enacted by 
that legislature in order to resolve apparent conflicts between statutes.54 
Justice Bastarache held that a declaration of invalidity under the 
Constitution implies that the impugned provision had not been enacted 
validly. Section 52 of the Constitution basically indicates that the legislature 
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had no authority to pass the provision in question. By contrast, section 
47 of the Code does not require the decision-making body to make any 
statement regarding the provision’s validity. Section 47 implies that the 
legislature had the power to enact the impugned provision; an issue only 
arises because the legislature also enacted another law that takes precedence 
over the impugned provision. Put another way, the analysis under section 
47 of the Code does not require a tribunal or court to “look behind the law” 
to consider a provision’s validity. The tribunal or court is not declaring 
that the legislature was wrong to enact the section in the first place. In 
Bastarache J.’s view, when a tribunal or court applies section 47 of the 
Code, “it is simply applying the tie-breaker supplied by, and amended 
according to the desires of, the legislature itself”.55 
The respondent’s final argument was based on the similarity between 
section 1 of the Code and section 15 of the Charter. The respondent 
argued that if an issue should be carved out of the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
because it is sufficiently complex to be a Charter issue, the same issue 
could also be carved out of the tribunal’s jurisdiction for constituting an 
issue under the Code. This argument was also dismissed by Bastarache J. 
He held that asking the tribunal to determine if a question was really a 
Charter question forced the tribunal to engage in a very complex analysis. 
At the heart of this complex analysis would be the issue of whether  
the Charter should apply followed by an inquiry into the comparative 
advantages of using the Code over the Charter. In Bastarache J.’s opinion, 
if one is to reason that the tribunal has been prevented from dealing with 
the Charter because Charter issues are complex, it is hard to maintain 
simultaneously that the legislature has conferred upon the tribunal the 
necessity to enter into a similarly complex analysis in order to determine 
its own jurisdiction.56  
In place of the respondent’s arguments, Bastarache J. put forth two 
reasons of his own to support the conclusion that the tribunal has 
jurisdiction under the Code despite its lack of jurisdiction under the 
Constitution. First, he pointed out that the legislature had not only indicated 
that the Code is to have primacy but had also provided instructions for 
how the application of the Code could be avoided. In particular, the 
Code is to apply unless another Act or regulation has provided expressly 
that it is to apply despite the Code. This is the only way that the Code’s 
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primacy could be disrupted. The legislature did not use this method with 
respect to the SBT. 
Second, Bastarache J. discussed the non-exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Ontario Human Rights Commission. He noted that while at one time 
exclusive jurisdiction had been given to human rights boards of inquiry 
to determine contraventions under the Code, the legislature had since 
altered its regime, allowing for concurrent jurisdiction between the Human 
Rights Commission and other decision-making bodies. He also noted 
that the Ontario Human Rights Commission could decline jurisdiction 
where the matter would be best adjudicated by another decision-making 
regime.57 Under the current version of the Human Rights Code, there is 
therefore no requirement that human rights matters go through the Human 
Rights Commission process. Moreover, Bastarache J. referred to Parry 
Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., 
Local 32458 and Charette for the proposition that human rights legislation 
be determined through a collection of administrative actors in order to 
foster a general culture of respect for human rights in the administrative 
justice system. 
Justice Bastarache finished his decision by turning his attention to 
whether the tribunal should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction in 
this case. The respondent argued that in cases where it is possible for 
two administrative bodies to have jurisdiction over an issue, the decision 
regarding which should have jurisdiction should hinge in part on an 
analysis of which of the two bodies would offer a better forum for resolving 
the dispute. Justice Bastarache noted that the respondent’s argument sought 
to apply the approach developed for cases of exclusive jurisdiction to 
cases of concurrent jurisdiction as well. Justice Bastarache held that, in 
order for the respondent’s argument to succeed, it would be important 
for the legislature to have granted the SBT the power to decline jurisdiction 
once seized of the matter. However, through an examination of the 
enabling statutes of the SBT and by comparison to other regimes in 
which the legislature had provided a court or administrative body the 
discretion to decline to hear an issue, Bastarache J. determined that the 
legislature had not granted this power to the SBT. This was enough to 
decide the appeal. 
Yet, although the lack of statutory power to decline jurisdiction was 
enough to determine the matter, Bastarache J. went on to comment on 
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the salutary aspects of having the SBT decide both the social benefit and 
human rights issues. He was very quick to stress, however, that despite 
the coincidence that the SBT happened to be the best forum in this case, 
the appropriateness of the tribunal was in no way determinative of its 
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of administrative tribunals derives solely from 
legislative intent and has no regard to factors like expertise and practical 
constraints. 
Nevertheless, as for the salutary effects of the SBT, Bastarache J. 
was of the opinion that the SBT was the best place to resolve the question 
of discrimination and whether section 5(2) of the ODSPA should be 
applicable. He noted that it is almost inescapable that applicants who have 
been denied financial assistance under the ODSPA will find themselves 
before the SBT. Pursuing alternate routes such as the process under the 
Human Rights Code may not be feasible in terms of time or resources. 
There was also no guarantee that the applicants’ concern would be heard 
by the Human Rights Tribunal. Justice Bastarache took into account that 
litigation concerns such as this one could involve a long process during 
which the applicants would receive no benefits. Overall, Bastarache J.’s 
reasons centred on the need to avoid creating barriers to human rights 
remedies, especially when dealing with vulnerable litigants. 
In completing his discussion, Bastarache J. offered some cautionary 
advice to tribunals. He asserted that when an administrative tribunal is 
properly seized of an issue by way of statutory appeal, and particularly 
an appeal in which a vulnerable applicant is attempting to defend his or 
her human rights, it would be rare for that tribunal not be the most 
appropriate forum to hear the entire dispute. Indeed, Bastarache J. went 
further, virtually closing the door to the possibility of a tribunal ever 
passing off the human rights arguments to another forum. He stated: 
I am unable to think of any situation where such a tribunal would be 
justified in ignoring the human rights argument, applying a potentially 
discriminatory provision, referring the legislative challenge to another 
forum, and leaving the appellant without benefits in the meantime.59 
Finally, Bastarache J. offered a warning to tribunals that may be 
tempted to argue that their practical constraints (such as efficiency) will 
prevent them from taking on matters outside of their direct expertise. In 
Bastarache J.’s opinion, a tribunal ought not avoid cases because they 
have assumed that the legislature did not provide them with sufficient 
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tools for determining the issues. Stated flatly, tribunals cannot ignore 
matters that the legislature intended them to consider if the legislature 
has not granted them the power to decline jurisdiction.  
(b) The Dissent 
Similar to Bastarache J., Abella J. made an effort to draw away all 
of the humanitarian aspects of this case in order to reveal it as strictly a 
case of statutory interpretation. In Abella J.’s words, Tranchemontagne 
“is not about access, about the applicability of human rights legislation, 
or about whether the government is entitled to refuse to provide disability 
benefits to individuals whose only substantial impairment is an alcohol 
or drug dependency. It is about the scope of the legislature’s intention when 
it enacted a statutory provision depriving an administrative tribunal of 
jurisdiction to decide whether any of its enabling provisions were ultra 
vires or violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”.60 More 
particularly, for Abella J., this case sought to determine in which forum  
a party could legally bring a challenge about the compliance of the ODSPA 
with the Code and whether such a challenge could be made before the 
Director of the Disability Support Program and/or the SBT.61 However, 
unlike the majority, the dissenting judges were of the opinion that the 
ODSPA’s provision prohibiting the SBT from determining the constitutional 
validity of its enabling legislation also prevented the tribunal from 
determining the compliance of its enabling statutes with the Code. 
Generally, the dissent’s reasons were based on an idea drawn from Martin 
that the legislature may intend to exclude a broad category of legal 
questions from the scope of issues that can be addressed by a tribunal.62 
The points of difference between Abella and Bastarache JJ. present 
quite a stark contrast. Indeed, Abella J.’s dissent focuses on three distinct 
aspects of the case: (i) the nature of subsection 47(2) of the Code; (ii) the 
reason for enactment of subsection 67(2) of the OWA (prohibiting 
consideration of constitutional validity); and (iii) practical considerations 
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rebutting the presumption that the SBT could determine the operability 
of provisions in its enabling legislation. 
As to the nature of subsection 47(2) of the Code, the dissenting judges 
saw this provision as one that promoted the values and rights expressed 
in the Code as being fundamental in nature. They pointed out that 
subsection 47(2) of the Code does not confer jurisdiction on any decision-
maker — it does nothing more than announce the primacy of the Code. 
Subsection 47(2) assumes that when a body with the authority to make 
decisions regarding the Code is asked to apply it, it will conduct its task so 
that the Human Rights Code prevails over any other inconsistent statutory 
provision. The section outlining the Code’s primacy is therefore only of 
interpretive assistance; it is not meant to grant jurisdiction to any particular 
decision-making body as the majority would maintain.63 
Justice Abella also discussed the reason why the section prohibiting 
the tribunal from considering the constitutional validity of a provision or 
the legislative authority of a regulation was enacted. She noted that this 
provision, subsection 67(2), was enacted after a former version of the 
SBT had granted itself jurisdiction to decide Charter matters through an 
interpretation of its legislation.64 Justice Abella looked at the provision 
broadly. In her view, it was clear that the primary legislative aim in creating 
subsection 67(2) was that the legislature did not want the SBT to be able 
to refuse to apply provisions of its enabling statute by finding them to be 
inoperable. She asserted that if one accepts this legislative aim, then it 
becomes difficult to accept the majority’s opinion that the SBT can render 
provisions of its enabling statute inoperable through the interpretation of 
some legislation, like the Code, but not through the interpretation of others 
such as the Constitution.65 
What is the difference between a tribunal rendering a provision 
constitutionally invalid and therefore inoperable under the Constitution 
on the one hand, and rendering a provision inapplicable by a quasi-
constitutional enactment, on the other? Justice Bastarache put heavy stock 
in this distinction but, on close analysis, the distinction is very hard to 
maintain. Justice Abella brought this question to the fore in her decision. 
She challenged that tribunals had never had the power to declare legislation 
invalid under the principles in Martin, but had been given only the 
jurisdiction to decline to apply a provision. Therefore, the majority’s 
                                                                                                            
63
 See Tranchemontagne, id., at paras. 72-73. 
64
 Id., at para. 78. 
65
 Id., at para. 80. 
82 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2007), 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
suggestion that the prohibition set out in subsection 67(2) does not extend 
to finding inoperability under the Code because the remedies under the 
Charter and Code are different, is difficult to sustain. Put another way, 
whether the challenge is brought under the Charter or under the Code, 
the only remedy that a tribunal can offer is to refuse to apply the impugned 
provision. To bring an additional element into the equation — namely, 
that the tribunal’s analysis under the Charter requires a determination of 
invalidity — does not make the argument stronger in favour of the 
tribunal’s ability to decide matters under the Code. 
Referring to the principles set out in Martin, Abella J. looked also 
for any practical reasons why the tribunal should not be able to determine 
Code issues. In terms of the SBT’s institutional characteristics, she found 
that neither the Director nor the SBT had the capacity to decide complex, 
time-consuming legal issues. For example, the Director does not hold 
hearings or receive evidence beyond what is filed by the applicant. 
(This presumably speaks to the impossibility of having broader public 
participation in the decision-making process through interveners, etc.) 
Similarly, the SBT’s process is informal and private with hearings that 
last no longer than 1 1/2 hours. Moreover, Abella J. noted the SBT’s 
backlog of cases in the year that Mr. Tranchemontagne and Mr. Werbeski’s 
applications had been submitted.  
It was obvious that asking the SBT to consider Code compliance 
would have an impact on its ability to fulfil its responsibility to ensure 
the payment of monetary benefits. The SBT would also not have the 
expertise to deal with complex and nuanced human rights determinations, 
unlike the Human Rights Commission. Moreover, unlike the statutory 
human rights regime, the disability benefits process does not provide the 
checks and balances to protect the integrity of the Code, the integrity of 
human rights adjudication, the interests of the public and that of the parties. 
Finally, Abella J. noted the express commentary made in the Legislative 
Assembly of Ontario during second reading of the OWA, indicating that 
constitutional questions were removed from the SBT’s jurisdiction because 
they are complex legal issues, with potentially far-reaching consequences 
that the legislators believed to be better addressed by the courts. 
(i) Commentary 
What is striking about the decision in Tranchemontagne is that both 
the majority and the dissent take a postural stance of deference to the 
legislature and classify their approach as pure statutory interpretation. 
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Yet, the two interpretive methods used are vastly different. One is tempted 
to classify the majority’s approach as formalist and the minority’s approach 
as functionalist. For the majority, pure statutory interpretation is an exercise 
of interpreting the Code and enabling statutes of the SBT. This exercise 
leads ultimately to the question of how to understand the provision of the 
Code asserting its primacy. The majority view is that primacy implies 
jurisdiction to give effect to this primacy on the part of any administrative 
body faced with a question that could fall under the Human Rights Code. 
Moreover, the majority comes to this conclusion, as Abella J. notes, 
despite the fact that there is no explicit indication in the statute that any 
other body should have jurisdiction under the Code and, arguably, despite 
clear indications in the statutes and elsewhere that Code issues were to 
be excluded from the jurisdiction of the social benefits process. This 
conclusion is not entirely convincing.  
As for the dissenting judges, inspiring their analysis from the 
methodology set out in Martin allows them to infuse their statutory 
interpretation with the practical considerations that are so compelling in 
this case. Yet, like the majority, the dissenting judges also try to focus 
solely on interpretation and remove all humanitarian aspects. 
However, with respect to both the majority and the dissent, trying to 
remove the issues in Tranchemontagne from its larger contextual aspect 
and placing it uniquely within a quest to validate legislative intent is 
problematic in itself. The decision leaves unaddressed and unanswered 
perennial problems such as administrative backlog, lack of resources 
and training, and decisions that are to be determined by decision-making 
bodies without the expertise in human rights to handle them. If the 
decisions on jurisdiction in the 2004-2005 term showed a battle between 
expert decision-making and expediency (i.e., having all legal questions 
decided in one forum) in which expediency was gaining ground, the 
2005-2006 term showed the triumph of neither. Some have argued that 
it would be useful for the concept of the rule of law to be used to bring 
about change to the administrative inefficiencies of the system.66 While 
this is a progressive idea, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision on 
access to justice and rule of law decided in the 2005-2006 term,67 it does 
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not seem that these fundamental concepts are gaining as much leverage 
as they could at the court. 
Moreover, although “pure statutory interpretation” is the stated objective 
of the majority approach, there is still much “impure non-statutory” 
discussion that circulates in Tranchemontagne. Unlike past years, the Court 
is very clear to state in its decision that it is relegating this discussion to 
a non-determinative realm. Yet, it is hard for the reader to ignore the 
human aspects of this case and the elements of administrative efficiency 
when they are nevertheless brought into the text. They are in some ways 
the most compelling aspects of the case and certainly do not become 
less so by the way in which they are introduced into the decision. For 
example, Bastarache J. began this discussion with a bit of legislative, 
factual and contextual history. He noted that it had been almost five years 
since Mr. Tranchemontagne and Mr. Werbeski were denied income support 
payments by the director. He further recognized the human aspect of the 
case by stating that if the appellants were ultimately successful in proving 
discrimination, they would have lived five years without the assistance 
they were owed. He further stated that no amount of interest could negate 
this fact. Justice Bastarache acknowledged as well that it is important that 
the Social Benefits Tribunal operate efficiently: it would be unfortunate 
to place interpretive demands on the tribunal if these demands resulted 
in slowing down the application process for the great bulk of applicants. 
However, whereas in past years, where the exclusive and concurrent 
jurisdiction cases were unclear about how such policy concerns should 
fit into the overall analysis to determine the appropriate jurisdiction, 
Bastarache J. is quick to clarify their place in Tranchemontagne. These 
considerations of practicality for the applicants and the efficient machinery 
of tribunal decision-making are to take second place to the pure pursuit of 
legislative intent. Justice Bastarache held: “Ultimately, ... this appeal  
is not decided by matters of practicality for applicants or matters of 
expediency for administrative tribunals. It is decided by following the 
statutory scheme enacted by the legislature.” Once again, as in the 2004-
2005 term, we are in a situation where the objective is to pursue legislative 
intent. But, whether in practice, legislative intent removed from all other 
considerations can be the sole guide for deciding matters of jurisdiction 
will remain debatable questions within the legal and tribunal communities.  
Nonetheless, Bastarache J.’s commentary on the significance of 
practical considerations in decisions regarding concurrent jurisdiction is 
useful. It provides more explicit guidance on the theoretical place of 
practical and policy considerations, such as lack of resources by a tribunal 
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to determine human rights matters and the desirability of asking potentially 
vulnerable applicants to bring their matters in two distinct fora, in 
determining questions of jurisdiction. Unlike the cases of exclusive 
jurisdiction from the 2004-2005 term, where policy considerations were 
brought into the discussion but where the Court was less clear in outlining 
the weight and value that these considerations should have in an analysis 
of determining the proper forum, the majority in Tranchemontagne 
points out firmly that policy considerations are not to be determinative at 
all of which of two potentially concurrent bodies should have jurisdiction 
over an issue. As Bastarache J. points out, if the matter has been brought 
properly before an administrative decision-maker, the question of whether 
it should transfer the matter to another administrative decision-maker is 
answered primarily by seeing if there are legislative indications that  
the matter is to be transferred, including a statutory power to decline 
jurisdiction by the body that has been seized of the matter.  
The majority also declares different approaches for concurrent  
and exclusive jurisdiction. It would appear that when a case deals with 
concurrent jurisdiction between administrative bodies, the question of 
whether one body represents a more appropriate forum than another is not 
a valid one. The answer to the jurisdiction question stems solely from an 
analysis of the relevant legislation. With respect to exclusive jurisdiction, 
the methodological analysis is quite different. When the issue is which 
of two bodies should have jurisdiction over matter and one body has an 
exclusivity clause (or has implied exclusivity over the matter), the analysis 
involved is the search for the “essential character” of the dispute. While 
the question of which forum is most appropriate may arise, asking the 
question explicitly may not always be relevant. The next case, Concordia 
University, shows the discussion of appropriateness implicit in the analysis 
of the essential character. Concordia University is also an interesting 
case because it is a decision in which both possible fora had elements of 
exclusivity. 
2. Bisaillon v. Concordia University 
Concordia University is the only case decided by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in the past two terms that deals with exclusive jurisdiction. 
This is quite a contrast to the 2004-2005 term where the Court spent a 
significant amount of energy on the question of exclusive jurisdiction. 
The cases of 2004-2005 were the first in almost a decade to advance 
vigorously the principles of methodology to be used in determining which 
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of competing decision-making bodies (including at times the courts) should 
have jurisdiction when one body could make a claim to exclusivity. 
Concordia University moves the discussion a step further. It addresses 
the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitrators in a case that pits them 
against the exclusive jurisdiction of the superior courts to take on class 
action suits. The result is a case that pushes forward the boundaries of 
not only jurisdiction in the administrative law context of labour law  
but simultaneously provides guiding principles on class action suits and 
civil procedure.  
At issue in Concordia University was whether a unionized employee 
of the university could institute a class action against the university in 
order to contest certain decisions that the university had made with 
respect to the administration and use of a supplemental pension plan.  
In particular, Mr. Bisaillon alleged that the university had used the  
funds inappropriately in order to pay for contribution holidays, cover 
administrative costs and to finance early retirement packages. The pension 
plan had been established by Concordia University for its employees 
and had more than 4,100 members. Over 80 per cent of the members 
were unionized employees covered by nine collective agreements that 
Concordia had concluded with its nine certified unions. In each of the 
nine collective agreements, there was direct or indirect reference to the 
pension plan.  
By instituting a class action, Mr. Bisaillon hoped to obtain a declaration 
that the changes that the university had made to the plan were null. He 
also sought to compel Concordia to pay back the money it had taken 
from the pension fund. Eight of the unions supported and financed Mr. 
Bisaillon’s attempt to institute a class action. The ninth union, CUFA, 
agreed to the changes made by the university. CUFA and Concordia 
University therefore opposed Mr. Bisaillon’s application for a class 
action suit. 
In the Québec Superior Court, CUFA, supported by Concordia, 
submitted that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to authorize a class 
action as the dispute dealt with collective bargaining and the implementation 
of the collective agreement. Because these matters lay within the exclusive 
domain of the certified unions, CUFA and Concordia argued that Mr. 
Bisaillon was bound to use the grievance procedure in order to attempt 
to resolve any disputes with Concordia regarding the plan.  
The Superior Court agreed with this. They allowed the request for 
declinatory exception sought by CUFA and Concordia and dismissed 
Mr. Bisaillon’s motion. The Superior Court held that the disputes dealt 
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with the application of the collective agreement since the pension plan 
was a benefit within it. As such, based on the Supreme Court decision in 
Weber v. Ontario Hydro,68 the Court held that the question lay within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the labour arbitrators appointed under the 
collective agreement.69 The Superior Court noted also that Mr. Bisaillon 
did not have rights that were distinct from the collective agreement and 
that Mr. Bisaillon had conceded that his class action was part of a 
negotiation strategy with the eight unions which, collectively, were 
trying to negotiate improvements to the pension plan. 
On appeal to the Québec Court of Appeal, the decision of the Québec 
Superior Court was overturned. The Court of Appeal found that the 
pension plan existed independently of any collective agreement. In the 
Court’s opinion, the case had nothing to do with the collective agreement 
that applied to Mr. Bisaillon and therefore did not fall within the jurisdiction 
of the grievance arbitrator. Moreover, the Court expressed concern that 
not one grievance arbitrator would have authority to hear all the claims 
raised in the class action. He or she would only be able to hear the 
claims of those who fell within the collective agreement over which he 
or she had jurisdiction. The result of leaving the matter to grievance 
arbitration was the possibility of several contradictory decisions stemming 
from the decisions of many arbitrators. The Court of Appeal held that the 
best result was for the Superior Court to exercise its residual jurisdiction 
to authorize a class action suit.70  
The narrow issue before the Supreme Court was therefore whether 
a class action suit was appropriate in this case or whether grievance 
arbitration was the correct forum. Determining this issue, however, required 
the Court to revisit and expand upon the principles relating to exclusive 
jurisdiction that they had set out in Weber and developed most recently in 
Morin and Charette. Concordia University is also of particular importance 
because it brings the notion of in personam jurisdiction to the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on exclusive jurisdiction. The Court held that 
grievance arbitration was the correct forum for this dispute. However, 
there was a narrow split of 4-3 among the justices of the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Justices LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Charron were the four 
judges who formed the majority. Their reasons were written by LeBel J. 
                                                                                                            
68
 [1995] S.C.J. No. 59, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929 [hereinafter “Weber”]. 
69
 See Bisaillon c. Concordia University, [2003] J.Q. no 4279 (S.C.). 
70
 See Bisaillon c. Concordia University, [2004] J.Q. no 3238 (C.A.). 
88 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2007), 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
The dissenting reasons of McLachlin C.J., Bastarache and Binnie JJ. were 
penned by Bastarache J. 
(a) Majority 
Justice LeBel framed the issue in Concordia University as being 
whether a class action suit could be used to bypass the representation and 
grievance resolution mechanisms that had been established within Québec 
labour law. Justice LeBel approached the analysis of this question by 
looking at four distinct aspects of the legal framework governing the issue: 
the nature of the class action suit, the collective representation system in 
Québec labour law, the jurisdiction of grievance arbitrators and the 
statutory framework governing supplemental pension plans. 
With respect to the nature of class action suits, over which the Québec 
Superior Court has exclusive jurisdiction, LeBel J. noted that although 
legislation on class actions should be construed flexibly and generously, 
class actions are a procedural vehicle that cannot modify or create 
substantive rights. In other words, a class action proceeding does not 
provide parties with a legal proceeding that they would not otherwise have 
on an individual basis. Moreover, the legal rules governing who has 
subject matter jurisdiction are not changed by the choice of procedure. 
Using a class action procedure does not have the effect of granting 
jurisdiction on the Superior Court when the subject matter would otherwise 
fall within the jurisdiction of another court or tribunal. 
As for collective representation, LeBel J. outlined some basic concepts. 
He pointed out that the Québec Labour Code71 gives certified unions a 
set of rights. The most important of these rights is the monopoly of 
representation. A certified union has the exclusive power to negotiate 
conditions of employment for all members of the bargaining unit. Once 
the collective agreement has been put in place, the union also has exclusive 
representation of rights with respect to its implementation and application. 
The union’s monopoly on representation has significant impact on 
employee rights. For example, employees are precluded from negotiating 
their individual conditions of employment directly with their employer. 
In return, employees improve their position vis-à-vis the employer, which 
usually has the greater balance of power. They also reap greater protection 
of their interests. The employer is also affected by the union’s monopoly 
of representation. On the one hand, the employer becomes obliged to 
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enter into good-faith collective bargaining with the union. On the other, the 
employer derives various benefits, such as the right to peace and stability 
in the workplace and an expectation that disagreements stemming from 
the collective agreement will be negotiated with the union or settled  
through the grievance arbitration process. 
Justice LeBel pointed out that there are two faces of a grievance 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction. The first is subject matter jurisdiction which 
includes the power to grant an appropriate remedy. A pre-condition to 
exercising subject matter jurisdiction is that the grievance arbitrator have 
jurisdiction over the “essential subject matter of the dispute” so that he 
or she can grant an appropriate remedy. Justice LeBel referred to the 
analytical approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Weber which held 
that a grievance arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction when “the dispute, 
in its essential character, arises from the interpretation, application, 
administration or violation of the collective agreement”72 Identifying the 
essential character of a dispute is an exercise that involves taking into 
account all the facts surrounding the dispute between the parties. Once 
the factual context has been determined, it must be examined to see 
whether the collective agreement explicitly or implicitly applies to it. 
Referring to cases such as Regina Police Assn. Inc. v. Regina (City) 
Board of Police Commissioners;73 Parry Sound (District) Social 
Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324;74 and St. Anne 
Nackawic Pulp & Paper Co. v. Canadian Paper Workers Union, Local 
219,75 LeBel J. stressed that the Supreme Court has repeatedly given 
grievance arbitrators generous exclusive jurisdiction over issues related 
to conditions of employment so long as there is some connection to the 
collective agreement. He held:  
 This Court has considered the subject-matter jurisdiction of grievance 
arbitrators on several occasions, and it has clearly adopted a liberal 
position according to which grievance arbitrators have a broad exclusive 
jurisdiction over issues relating to conditions of employment, provided 
that those conditions can be shown to have an express or implicit 
connection to the collective agreement…76 
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Using this as a springboard, LeBel J. reasoned that the provisions of  
the collective agreement relating to pension plans could also fall within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of grievance arbitrators. He pointed out that the 
Québec Court of Appeal had held arbitrators to have exclusive jurisdiction 
over such issues on numerous occasions. He noted, as well, that there was 
a recent trend in the Québec Court of Appeal to grant grievance arbitrators 
exclusive jurisdiction even when there is no reference to the pension 
plan in the collective agreement. He referred to two cases: Hydro-Québec 
v. Corbeil;77 and Association provinciale des retraités d’Hydro-Québec v. 
Hydro-Québec.78 In Corbeil, for instance, the Court found that the pension 
plan formed part of the employee’s remuneration and conditions of 
employment. As a consequence, it was held to be an integral part of the 
collective agreement. In a similar vein, LeBel J. noted that commentators 
on the issue have also argued that general clauses such as those recognizing 
employers’ management rights could confer jurisdiction over issues dealing 
with the application and implementation of benefits, including those in a 
pension plan. 
The second aspect of a grievance arbitrator’s jurisdiction is in 
personam jurisdiction. In personam jurisdiction encapsulates the idea 
that the arbitrator must have jurisdiction over the parties to the dispute. 
If the collective agreement does not apply to parties bringing the claim, 
then the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to hear the claim of those parties. 
Justice LeBel indicated that the ordinary courts retain jurisdiction over a 
dispute when grievance arbitrators lack jurisdiction. Issues of in personam 
jurisdiction sometimes occur when third parties are involved. Arbitrators 
do not have to ensure that their decisions will have no effect on third parties 
as third parties who are affected by arbitration decisions will not be legally 
bound by them. But, as LeBel J. asserted, “there is nothing to prevent 
third parties from voluntarily and expressly submitting to a grievance 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction, thereby bestowing jurisdiction upon him or her”.79  
Justice LeBel finished his discussion on the jurisdiction of grievance 
arbitrators with commentary on the residual jurisdiction of the Superior 
Court. He repeated that in cases where a grievance arbitrator lacks the 
authority to grant the remedy required to resolve the dispute, the courts 
retain residual inherent jurisdiction. Justice LeBel asserted, however, 
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that this special jurisdiction of the Superior Court was not an issue in the 
present case. 
Finally, LeBel J. analyzed statutory framework governing supplemental 
pension plans. He noted that the administration and operation of pension 
plans is overseen by the Régie des rentes du Québec, the governing body 
that ensures compliance with the Supplemental Pension Plans Act.80 
Justice LeBel noted that while the Régie des rentes is not a tribunal and 
is not designed to resolve disagreements over the interpretation of pension 
plans, it does establish a consensual arbitration process for certain disputes81 
Justice LeBel pointed out that the case at bar was not covered by the 
arbitral powers of the Régie des rentes. 
In light of these general principles, LeBel J. asserted that Mr. 
Bisaillon’s position “undermine[d] two pillars of our collective labour 
relations system: the exclusivity of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and the 
collective representation system”.82 As for the exclusivity of the 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction, LeBel J. criticized the Québec Court of Appeal 
for adopting the wrong methodology and therefore reaching an incorrect 
result. In his opinion, the Court of Appeal should have started its inquiry 
by determining if a grievance arbitrator had jurisdiction to rule on the 
individual proceeding between Mr. Bisaillon and Concordia. It should 
have then considered the nature of the individual claims of the majority 
of the group and the in personam jurisdiction of the arbitrator with 
respect to those claims. Because the Court of Appeal did not do this, it 
ended up removing individual proceedings over which the arbitrator had 
jurisdiction from the grievance arbitration process to the Superior Court. 
Yet, the Superior Court had no jurisdiction over the parties or the subject 
matter and could not acquire jurisdiction simply because the motion for 
class action had been filed. More generally, LeBel J. was of the view 
that the Court of Appeal should not have focused as it did on 
determining whether the grievance arbitrator had jurisdiction over every 
potential member of the group covered by the class action. 
Justice LeBel held that labour arbitrators would have exclusive 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute. The facts of the case 
dealt with unilateral amendments made by the university to the pension 
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plan and their validity. Moreover, the collective agreement provisions 
referred to the pension plan. In LeBel J.’s opinion, Mr. Bisaillon’s issues 
were implicitly and perhaps even explicitly linked to the collective 
agreements and their application. Finally, LeBel J. opined that a grievance 
arbitrator would have the necessary jurisdiction to declare the employer’s 
decision null and to issue an appropriate remedy. As such, this was not a 
case in which the Superior Court could validly exercise its exceptional 
residual jurisdiction. The Québec Superior Court was correct to declare 
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. 
Justice LeBel finished his decision with comments on the problem 
of potentially conflicting multiple decisions arising from arbitration 
awards made in respect to the many bargaining units. LeBel J. held that 
the possibility of conflicting decisions was not enough to justify a 
conclusion that the Superior Court had jurisdiction instead of grievance 
arbitrators. Justice LeBel wrote: 
 Although I am of the view that the trial judge correctly concluded 
that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction in the instant case, I must 
admit that this solution is not free of procedural difficulties, particularly 
because of the multiplicity of possible proceedings and of potential 
conflicts between separate arbitration awards in respect of the different 
bargaining units. However, the potential difficulties are not sufficient 
to justify referring the matter to the Superior Court and holding that it 
has jurisdiction.83 
In LeBel J.’s opinion, it had not been demonstrated that a real 
possibility of chaos resulting from contradictory decisions could exist. 
Justice LeBel theorized that there were various options under the rules of 
labour law that could be used to prevent multiple arbitration proceedings. 
For example, he indicated that many of the unions could decide to come 
to an agreement with the employer to submit the various grievances to a 
single arbitrator. He felt that this should have been the preferred approach 
for all parties involved and that it would be difficult for the employer to 
oppose this approach. Justice LeBel also noted that if one arbitrator 
decided a grievance by one of the unions in favour of that union, all the 
employees would benefit indirectly from the award. This is because all 
the money wrongfully taken from the pension plan would be returned. 
This was a point with which the dissenting judges took great issue. 
Furthermore, in LeBel J.’s view, once one grievance had been decided, all 
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the other grievances filed by the other unions would, in practice, become 
moot. At worst, in the wake of contradictory or incompatible arbitration 
awards, Concordia University could probably resolve any conflicts  
by complying with the award least favourable to it. In sum, multiple 
proceedings could be avoided by tools of civil procedure in addition to 
tools of labour law. Moreover, LeBel J. did not see anything to infer that 
holding labour arbitration as the appropriate forum would permit the 
unions to benefit more greatly than the employer by encouraging them 
to file multiple grievances and forcing the employer to abide by the award 
most unfavourable to it. 
(b) Dissent 
Unlike the majority, the dissenting judges (McLachlin C.J.C., 
Bastarache and Binnie JJ.) held that labour arbitrators did not have 
exclusive jurisdiction over Mr. Bisaillon’s claim. They held that the Québec 
Superior Court had jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Bisaillon’s application 
for a class action proceeding and that an application to the Québec Superior 
Court was the only procedure available that could settle conclusively the 
question of the university’s financing of the pension fund. In reaching 
this conclusion, Bastarache J. for the dissent added that their decision 
was not intended to indicate whether Mr. Bisaillon’s class action should 
be certified or whether he had “sufficient interest” to proceed with the claim 
without his union — these issues were for the Québec Superior Court to 
decide.  
Concordia University shows us an interesting change of roles in the 
court. Chief Justice McLachlin and Bastarache and Binnie JJ. all held very 
strong opinions in the cases on exclusive jurisdiction in the 2004-2005 
term. In Concordia University they came together to counter the decision 
of LeBel J. and the majority. The dissent in Concordia University centred 
on two main points made by the majority: (a) whether there was a sufficient 
nexus between the pension plan and the collective agreement to maintain 
that the collective agreement was a valid source of the labour arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction; and (b) the degree to which there was the possibility of 
multiple incompatible arbitration decisions and the degree to which such 
multiple proceedings could be problematic.  
Justice Bastarache agreed with many aspects of LeBel J.’s decision. 
However, he indicated that where he parted views with LeBel J. was with 
respect to his conclusion. In Bastarache J.’s opinion, an analysis of the 
facts of this case under the Weber principles did not lead to the conclusion 
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that the pension dispute could be traced back to the collective agreement. 
Indeed, a clear indication that Weber had been misapplied was that different 
courts and arbitrators, all gaining jurisdiction from different collective 
agreement and employment contracts, could come to mutually incompatible 
positions on how the university should administer the plan. As Bastarache J. 
put it: 
With respect, however, I believe the risk of inconsistent decisions is 
symptomatic of a misapplication of Weber. I cannot agree that Weber 
allows for the same party to be bound by inconsistent directions from 
different courts and arbitrators, all claiming — rightfully, according to 
my colleague — to have jurisdiction over the essential character of the 
dispute. The fact that this possibility exists here confirms that the 
essential character of this appeal arises out of something other than the 
collective agreement: the Plan itself.84 
Justice Bastarache pointed out that there are limits to the idea that 
labour arbitrators have exclusive jurisdiction. Weber did not stand for 
the proposition that labour arbitrators always have exclusive jurisdiction 
when a dispute arises relating to the conditions of employment of unionized 
employees. Indeed, there are many aspects of the employer-employee 
relationship that do not stem from the collective agreement. Morin was 
an example of a case in which the essential character of the dispute was 
determined to be a human rights matter that did not stem from the collective 
agreement. There, the issue to be determined was whether the addition of a 
new term of collective agreement discriminated against certain employees. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that labour arbitration was not the only 
forum and that having the matter decided by the Human Rights Tribunal 
was a better fit.  
Justice Bastarache was of the opinion that Concordia, too, is a case 
in which labour arbitrators do not have exclusive jurisdiction. Justice 
Bastarache interpreted Weber as indicating that the matter must arise out 
of “a single collective agreement, concluded between a single union  
and the employer” in order to be subject to a labour arbitrator’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.85 For Bastarache J., the fact that the pension plan represented 
one indivisible patrimony was a very big element that deserved more 
attention than LeBel J. had given it. The pension fund transcended any 
one collective agreement. A necessary implication of this was that every 
beneficiary of the plan, regardless of the collective agreement with which 
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he or she was affiliated, was affected by the changes to the plan of 
which the respondent complained. Viewed in light of these attributes, 
the respondent’s claim could not logically be located in any one collective 
agreement. There was a connection that linked all of the beneficiaries of 
the pension funds, however, that came from the way that the changes to 
the fund affected all of the beneficiaries and the resulting claim that they 
wished to make. While the collective agreement served as the reason 
why the respondent had an interest in the financing of the pension fund, 
this was not enough to say that the essential character of the respondent’s 
claim stemmed from the collective agreement. Justice Bastarache also 
noted that identifying the essential character of the dispute as arising 
from the collective agreements would result in various parties dictating the 
management of the fund for every other beneficiary by labour arbitrators 
including beneficiaries over whom a particular labour arbitrator may not 
have jurisdiction.  
Justice Bastarache argued that the labour arbitrator did not have  
in personam jurisdiction. While LeBel J. had limited the parties to the 
respondent and Concordia University, Bastarache J. reasoned that it was 
more accurate to recognize that all beneficiaries of the fund could claim 
to be involved and that a labour arbitrator would not have jurisdiction 
over all these parties. 
Finally, unlike the majority, Bastarache J. was of the opinion that the 
possibility of inconsistent decisions merely confirmed that the essential 
character of Mr. Bisaillon’s claim arose out of the plan itself and not the 
collective agreement.86 
Justice Bastarache held that the risk of contradictory rulings in this 
case was inevitable in both theory and practice. As a practical matter, 
Bastarache J. pointed out that Lebel J. had himself identified the incentive 
for employees to bring multiple claims. Justice Lebel had noted that: 
“Assuming the worst, if there were contradictory or incompatible arbitration 
awards, Concordia could probably, subject to the limited possible grounds 
for judicial review by the Superior Court, resolve any conflict by complying 
with the award least favourable to it.”87 Although Lebel J. saw this as a 
reason for conflicting judgments to work themselves out, Bastarache J. 
was of the opinion that this was the catalyst for a constant reopening of 
the dispute over financing of the pension fund. Justice Bastarache reasoned 
that so long as the arbitrator rendered a decision that was unsatisfactory 
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to one of the remaining eight unions, it would be inevitable that the 
dispute would be reopened.  
But Justice Bastarache found it even more worrisome that there  
was a risk of contradictory rulings in theory. Here, his concern centred on 
clarifying the proper application of the Weber test. Justice Bastarache 
emphasized very strongly the unusual nature of the contradictory claims 
that would arise from the majority’s conclusion that the essential 
character of the dispute could be located in the collective agreements 
and employment contracts. Unlike many situations of inconsistency that 
arise in legal interpretation,88 the majority’s holding would lead to the 
situation where the same indivisible pension fund would be set to contain 
a certain amount of money by one arbitrator in a different amount  
of money by another. Justice Bastarache noted that this is the kind of 
inconsistency “that purports to resolve the same, singular claim in 
different ways”.89  
In Bastarache J.’s opinion, it would be impossible to reconcile 
contradictory orders of this nature. He noted that the jurisdictional absurdity 
of the situation that was sure to ensue from the majority’s disposition 
was aggravated by two additional factors. First, the university would be 
bound by all the arbitration decisions, including the contradictory ones. 
Second, he took a precursory appreciation of the standard of review, 
observing that it was likely that the various arbitrators’ decisions would 
merit some deference. As a consequence, resorting to judicial review to 
reconcile contradictory arbitral orders would not necessarily be a successful 
task as each order may escape being overturned by being sufficiently 
reasonable. 
Justice Bastarache completed his analysis with a comment on the 
Weber test and the notion of the essential character of the dispute. He 
held that the notion of an essential character cannot be given such a 
broad meaning as to allow a single dispute to arise out of many different 
sources simultaneously, with each yielding jurisdiction for different forums. 
If the Weber test is applied in this way, as was done by the majority, its 
insight will be defeated.  
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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In 2007, two decisions dealing with standard of review were released 
by the Supreme Court, City of Lévis and Via Rail. Both dealt with 
determining when multiple standards of review, as opposed to one standard 
of review, should apply to the decision or order of an administrative body. 
1. Lévis (City) v. Fraternité des policiers de Lévis Inc.  
City of Lévis90 is a decision that deals with issues of standard of 
review, statutory interpretation, municipal law and police discipline/ethics. 
In City of Lévis, a municipal police officer charged with criminal conduct 
was dismissed by the municipality. His union filed a grievance on his 
behalf which led to many levels of judicial review of an arbitrator’s 
decision. 
Rendering the case somewhat complex is the fact that two statutes 
govern the discipline of municipal police officers in Québec: the Police 
Act91 and the Cities and Towns Act.92 Moreover, the two Acts come into 
conflict respecting the sanctions they provide to discipline police officers 
charged with criminal offences. 
More specifically, section 119 of the Police Act provides for automatic 
dismissal of any police officer found guilty of an offence under the 
Criminal Code.93 Paragraph 2 of section 119 allows for an exception to 
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this general sanction. This exception was created to allow for less 
stringent discipline of police officers in cases where dismissal would be 
disproportionately harsh. It requires the police officer to demonstrate 
that another sanction should apply. In addition to the Police Act, the 
Cities and Towns Act also provides sanctions for municipal police officer 
misconduct. Subsection 116(6) of the Cities and Towns Act provides 
that individuals who have been convicted of an act that is punishable 
under a law of the Parliament of Canada or the Québec legislature and that 
entails a year’s imprisonment or more shall be disqualified from being 
an officer of the municipality. The disqualification lasts for five years. 
Furthermore, the disqualification applies only if the offence committed 
by the individual relates to the municipal office or employment that he or 
she holds.94 Because Mr. Belleau, the officer in question in City of Lévis, 
was a municipal police officer, both statutes could apply. 
The labour arbitrator who heard Mr. Belleau’s grievance was therefore 
faced with two major issues to determine. The first was the question of 
determining whether the Police Act or the Cities and Towns Act should 
apply to the conduct of Mr. Belleau. A second question of the appropriate 
sanction to discipline Mr. Belleau’s conduct then had to be addressed. 
On judicial review, a further issue arose regarding whether these 
interrelated questions should attract two distinct standards of review. 
The labour arbitrator held that the Police Act was the applicable law. 
His reasoning was based on the theory of statutory interpretation that 
maintains that a special law prevails over a general law when two laws 
are in conflict. As a consequence, the arbitrator determined that section 119, 
paragraph 2 had rendered subsection 116(6) of the Cities and Towns Act 
inapplicable to municipal police officers. In terms of applying the Police 
Act, the arbitrator determined that he had jurisdiction to consider the 
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circumstances surrounding the criminal acts and to determine if they 
negated the requirement of a dismissal.95 He held that there were indeed 
special circumstances warranting a lesser sanction. The arbitrator therefore 
set aside the municipality’s decision and ordered that the officer be 
reinstated without compensation. In essence, the arbitrator’s order 
amounted to a 16-month suspension without pay. Mr. Belleau had been 
charged with offences relating to the careless storage of firearms in his 
home. In the arbitrator’s view, these were “technical” offences. The 
arbitrator took into consideration, in reaching its conclusion, that Mr. 
Belleau had recently moved into the house where he was living, that it 
was undergoing extensive renovations and that there was no place in the 
house where firearms could have been safely stored. As regards Mr. 
Belleau’s violence towards his spouse and the breach of his undertaking 
not to communicate with her, the arbitrator held that although these 
offences are serious, the expert medical opinion that he was in a morbid 
state due to family problems and that he was intoxicated should be taken 
into account. Finally, as for public perception, the arbitrator determined 
that the public had been misinformed by the media of the circumstances of 
the officer’s case. He was also of the opinion that the officer’s supervisors 
and colleagues would regain confidence in him once they were informed 
of the true circumstances. These attenuating factors helped the arbitrator 
to reach the conclusion that Mr. Belleau should be reinstated but that he 
should undergo a period of suspension without pay.96 
At the Superior Court of Québec, Lemelin J. determined that one 
standard of review, patent unreasonableness, should apply to the entire 
arbitral decision. Justice Lemelin held that the arbitrator’s decision that 
the Cities and Towns Act was inapplicable constituted a reviewable error. 
In his opinion, there was no indication by the legislature that it intended 
to exclude municipal police officers from the reach of the Cities and 
Towns Act. Justice Lemelin held that the Cities and Towns Act applied 
and should have led the arbitrator to dismiss Mr. Belleau from his duties. 
The Superior Court also found the arbitrator’s application of section 119, 
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paragraph 2 of the Police Act to be patently unreasonable. Justice Lemelin 
was of the view that the expert opinion led by the officer on the issue of 
his alcoholism was not convincing and should not have been accepted. 
He held that since the arbitrator’s conclusion on this point was central to 
his decision, it rendered his entire decision patently unreasonable.97 
The union and the police officer appealed from the Superior Court 
decision to the Québec Court of Appeal,98 where the Court held that two 
different standards of review were necessary as the arbitrator’s decision 
raised separate questions. In the Court’s opinion, the question of whether 
the Cities and Towns Act and the Police Act are compatible attracted a 
reasonableness standard of review. The arbitrator’s decision rendered 
under section 119 of the Police Act, on the other hand, should be evaluated 
on a standard of patent unreasonableness. In reviewing the arbitrator’s 
decision, the Court of Appeal held that the arbitrator had not committed 
any reviewable errors. Like the arbitrator, the Court of Appeal was of 
the opinion that the two statutes were in conflict and that the Police Act 
should prevail. Its analysis was based on two presumptions of statutory 
interpretation: the first being that a new law is intended to prevail over an 
old law; the second being that a special law is intended to take precedence 
over a general one. As regards the application of the Police Act, the Court 
of Appeal was of the view that the arbitrator was entitled to consider the 
technical nature of the firearm offences and the officer’s family crisis in 
determining if any specific circumstances existed. The Court of Appeal 
held that the arbitrator’s finding regarding Mr. Belleau’s alcoholism did 
not play a central role in the arbitrator’s decision and was not in itself 
patently unreasonable. In the end, the Court of Appeal restored the 
arbitrator’s award. 
The city appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The issues before 
the Court were the question of the appropriate standard or standards of 
review to apply, whether the arbitrator had chosen the correct statutes to 
govern the municipal police officer’s discipline and whether the arbitrator 
had committed a reviewable error in finding that the officer should 
receive a sanction other than dismissal under section 119, paragraph 2 of 
the Police Act. The majority of the Court held that this was a case in 
which more than one standard of review should apply. Moreover, it was 
held that the Cities and Towns Act and that the Police Act were in conflict 
and that the Police Act should take precedence in this case. Finally, the 
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majority held that the arbitrator failed to take into account the gravity 
of the offences and the effect that they would have on public confidence. 
Consequently, the arbitrator committed a reviewable error in reaching 
the conclusion that there were specific circumstances warranting a sanction 
less serious than dismissal. Although all the justices were in agreement 
that the arbitrator’s decision could not be sustained, they presented three 
sets of concurring decisions. Justice Bastarache wrote the majority opinion 
in which MacLachlin C.J., Binnie and Charron JJ. concurred. Separate 
concurring reasons were penned by Deschamps and Fish JJ. Finally, 
Abella J. provided concurring reasons as well. 
(a) Majority Concurring Reasons: Chief Justice McLachlin and 
Bastarache, Binnie and Charron JJ. 
Writing for the majority, Bastarache J. started his analysis by 
addressing the standard of review. He held that two distinct standards of 
review were required for the separate concerns that arose in this case. 
Using the pragmatic and functional approach, Bastarache J. determined 
that the conflict of law question attracted a standard of correctness while 
the interpretation and application of the applicable law was reviewable 
on a standard of reasonableness. 
Justice Bastarache offered useful theoretical guidance on how to 
determine when multiple standards of review should apply. He observed 
that the pragmatic and functional approach may lead to different standards 
of review for separate findings, although this is not always the case. 
Most frequently, administrative decision-makers called upon to construe 
statutes that are external to their enabling legislation, may face a different 
standard of review for the interpretation of the external question of law. 
On many occasions, interpretations of external legislation have been 
reviewed on a standard of correctness. However, Bastarache J. pointed 
out that this is not a hard and fast rule and that the appropriate standard 
of review will depend on a proper application of the pragmatic and 
functional approach.99 
As a general principle, Bastarache J. indicated that the presence or 
absence of a privative clause will likely have the least influence on 
determining whether more than one standard of review are applicable. 
                                                                                                            
99
 Although Bastarache J.’s comments on multiple standards of review in City of Lévis, 
supra, note 90, at para. 19 at times referred to the situation of arbitrators specifically, he appears to 
have been making observations that apply to administrative decision-makers generally. 
102 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2007), 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
This is because the presence or absence of a privative clause is generally 
the same for all aspects of an administrative decision. More important to 
the analysis of determining whether multiple standards apply, is whether 
there exist questions of different natures and whether those questions 
engage the decision-maker’s expertise and the legislative objective in 
different ways.  
Ultimately, the question of determining whether more than one 
standard of review applies to a decision comes down to a question of 
balancing. Justice Bastarache warned that the possibility of multiple 
standards “should not be taken as a licence to parse an administrative 
decision into myriad parts”.100 On the other hand, reviewing courts must 
be careful not to envelop distinct questions into one broad standard of 
review. As well, while it may not always be easy to separate individual 
questions from the entire decision, multiple standards of review should be 
adopted “when there are clearly defined questions that engage different 
concerns under the pragmatic and functional approach”.101 
Once the majority had determined the appropriate standard of review, 
the more substantive questions regarding the appropriate law to apply to 
the municipal police officer was addressed. In reaching the conclusion that 
section 119, paragraph 2 of the Police Act and subsection 116(6) of the 
Cities and Towns Act conflict, the majority was of the opinion that there 
is a clear zone where the practical effect of the two statutory provisions 
could not be reconciled. For many of the same offences, the Police Act 
might allow a police officer to maintain his employment with the 
municipality if he or she can show specific circumstances where the Cities 
and Towns Act cannot. Justice Bastarache held that the application of the 
Cities and Towns Act would necessarily preclude the application of  
the exception in the Police Act. As a consequence, this situation is one 
in which “one enactment says ‘yes’ and the other says ‘no’”.102 
In determining that the Police Act should prevail, the majority 
sought to ascertain the legislature’s intent. Because there was no express 
indication of which law should prevail, the majority also relied on the 
two presumptions of statutory interpretation: that more recent laws should 
prevail over earlier laws and that special laws should take precedence over 
general ones. The Police Act was both more recent and more specific. 
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Furthermore, the majority noted from the legislative debates that the 
exception for specific circumstances was created to meet the concerns of 
police associations who believed that it may not always be fair to dismiss 
a police officer convicted of a hybrid offence. Applying subsection 116(6) 
of the Cities and Towns Act to municipal police officers who have 
committed hybrid offences would undermine this objective.103 
As for whether “specific circumstances” existed in this situation, the 
majority held that they did not. The majority asserted that in determining 
whether specific circumstances exist, it is important to take into account 
the special role of police officers and the effect of a criminal conviction 
on their capacity to carry out their functions. The majority did not share 
the arbitrator’s opinion that the firearm offences could be attributed to 
Mr. Belleau’s personal problems or characterized as technical offences. 
More important in the majority’s view was Mr. Belleau’s breach of 
undertaking with the court not to communicate with his spouse. This 
showed a lack of respect for the judicial system of which he was an 
integral part. In sum, the arbitrator failed to weigh properly the effect of 
the police officer’s criminal conduct on his ability to carry out his duties 
as a police officer. This had a negative impact on the rationality of the 
arbitrator’s decision. Moreover, the arbitrator failed to take into account 
the seriousness of the offences committed by the police officer and the 
effect that they would have on public confidence. In sum, the arbitrator’s 
                                                                                                            
103
 Justice Bastarache dismissed three arguments made by the city as to why the Cities and 
Towns Act should prevail. The first was that the Police Act contained no express exclusion of the Cities 
and Towns Act. The Cities and Towns Act had been modified several times after the Police Act had 
been enacted. However, on none of these occasions did the legislature modify the application of ss. 
116(6). Justice Bastarache did not find this line of reasoning persuasive. In his opinion, since there 
was no express legislative intent whatsoever, it could just as easily be said that s. 119 of the Police 
Act was intended to apply to all police officers without distinction. The second argument was that 
the legislative debates surrounding s. 119, para. 2 of the Police Act did not mention ss. 116(6) of the 
Cities and Towns Act. The city argued that this was also evidence that the Cities and Towns Act was 
to take precedence over the Police Act. By contrast, Bastarache J. held that this seemed to be further 
evidence that the legislature intended s. 119, para. 2 of the Police Act to apply equally to all police 
officers. He reasoned that if municipal police officers were to be excluded, one would expect that 
this point would have been raised in the legislative discussions. Finally, the city argued that 
allowing the Police Act to prevail over the Cities and Towns Act would create two classes of municipal 
employees with municipal police officers being treated more leniently than other municipal employees. In 
Bastarache J.’s view, however, this was an unfounded concern. It did not speak to the fact that the 
opposite situation allowing the Cities and Towns Act to prevail would also create two classes of 
police officers which may be contrary to the intention behind s. 119 of the Police Act. He also noted 
that municipal police officers were treated differently from other police officers before the enactment 
of s. 119, para. 2 of the Police Act because ss. 116(6) specified that disqualification would only be 
incurred if the offence was in connection with the municipal office held. He also disagreed that 
municipal police officers would be treated more leniently if the Police Act were to prevail since 
they are required to show specific circumstances. 
104 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2007), 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
conclusion that the specific circumstances raised by the officer were 
sufficient to satisfy the exception in section 119 of Police Act was 
unreasonable.  
(b) Minority Concurring Reasons: Justices Deschamps and Fish 
Justices Deschamps and Fish agreed with Bastarache J.’s conclusion 
that the Police Act applied to the facts of the case. Implicitly, they also 
agreed with the standards of review proposed by Bastarache J. However, 
they did not agree that the Police Act and the Cities and Towns Act conflict.  
In the opinion of Deschamps and Fish JJ., this was not a situation in 
which one enactment says “yes” and the other says “no”. It was possible 
to reconcile the two statutes, especially when there are no specific 
circumstances to justify a sanction other than dismissal.104 
(c) Minority Concurring Reasons: Justice Abella 
Justice Abella agreed with Bastarache J.’s conclusion that the Police 
Act and the Cities and Towns Act conflict and that the Police Act should 
prevail in these circumstances. She took issue, however, with Bastarache 
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J.’s analysis and conclusion regarding the standard of review. In Abella J.’s 
opinion, only one standard of review should apply to both the arbitrator’s 
decision regarding which law to apply and to his application of the law. 
Unlike Bastarache J., who held that the absence or presence of a 
privative clause will assist little in an analysis of whether more than one 
standard is necessary, Abella J. placed significant emphasis on the privative 
clause in determining the appropriate standard(s) of review. Justice Abella 
pointed out that the Labour Code contained an unequivocal privative 
clause that bound the parties with no appeal.105 She noted also that an 
arbitrator acting within his or her jurisdiction under the Labour Code 
had the power to “interpret and apply any Act or regulation to the extent 
necessary to settle a grievance”.106 In Abella J.’s opinion, these were 
clear legislative indications that should be taken into account in any 
assessment of the degree of deference owed to an arbitrator. Moreover, 
she considered that the expertise of the arbitrator in labour disputes and 
the legislative intent of having them resolved quickly and with finality 
were factors that militated towards an integrated standard of review. 
Justice Abella warned against the unduly interventionist approach 
that could result from the desire of reviewing courts to parse routinely 
the mandate of administrative decision-makers. In her opinion, such an 
interventionist approach was more in line with the older doctrine of 
collateral question than with the more modern and deferential approach 
espoused by the pragmatic and functional approach. She asserted that 
issues that are legitimately and necessarily intertwined with an adjudicator’s 
mandate and expertise should lead to the decision being reviewed as a 
whole “not as a segmented compilation subject to an increased degree of 
scrutiny and intervention”.107 On the other hand, legal issues that are 
genuinely external to the adjudicator’s mandate or expertise and easily 
differentiated from other issues in the case may legitimately attract 
heightened scrutiny. 
In this particular case, however, the labour arbitrator’s mandate and 
expertise entitled him to a single deferential standard of review. This 
standard, which she seems to agree was reasonableness, should apply 
both to his decision regarding the scope of the relevant legislation and its 
application. The question of parsing administrative decisions to determine 
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if multiple standards of review should apply is one that was taken up 
again in Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. Via Rail Canada Inc.108 
2. Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. Via Rail Canada Inc. 
Decided the day after City of Lévis, Via Rail also addressed the 
question of when a single standard of review should apply. This time, 
however, unlike City of Lévis, it was held that one single standard of review 
should apply although the decision in question arguably contained several 
parts. Via Rail is a rich decision that addresses standard of review, human 
rights (specifically, the duty to accommodate passengers with abilities) 
and the validity of voluntary codes within administrative contexts. This 
discussion will restrict itself to the primarily administrative law debate 
that took place over how to decide when multiple standards of review 
should apply.  
Via Rail dealt with the review of a decision of the Canadian 
Transportation Agency (“CTA”, “agency”). The agency had held that 
Via Rail’s purchase of a new set of rail cars (the “Renaissance cars”) had 
not been properly modified to meet accessibility standards for persons 
with disabilities. Under the 1998 Code of Practice—Passenger Rail Car 
Accessibility Terms and Conditions of Carriage by Rail of Persons with 
Disabilities (“Rail Code”), a voluntary code of conduct that Via Rail 
(“VIA”) had negotiated and to which it agreed, new rail cars undergoing 
major refurbishment were required to be designed to allow passengers 
with disabilities to use their personal wheelchairs on the train. The Council 
of Canadians with Disabilities applied to the agency under the Canada 
Transportation Act.109 It argued that 46 features of the Renaissance cars 
constituted undue obstacles to the mobility of persons with disabilities. The 
Council relied in part on VIA’s alleged non-compliance with the Rail Code. 
VIA argued that the Rail Code standards that were relevant were 
those applicable to existing cars. VIA submitted that the Renaissance 
cars met these standards and that it was not required to retrofit them to 
improve accessibility. Throughout the agency’s inquiry, VIA was less 
than cooperative, filing incomplete data and rendering the agency’s 
inquiry difficult to accomplish. On March 27, 2003, the agency issued a 
preliminary decision that took the form of a “show cause” order. Through 
this order, VIA was asked to show cause by May 26, 2003, why obstacles 
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that the agency had identified as undue obstacles were not in fact undue 
obstacles. In April 2003, VIA sought leave to appeal from the preliminary 
order. In August 2003, VIA indicated to the agency that it did not intend 
to comply with its preliminary order. VIA asked the agency for an oral 
hearing, if necessary, or for the agency to render its decision in final form.  
The agency rendered its final decision on October 29, 2003 based 
on the record it had before it. The agency ordered Via Rail to implement 
six remedial measures, five of which involved making physical changes 
to the Renaissance cars. Via Rail appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal. 
With its application for appeal, it submitted a commissioned cost estimate 
dated less than 40 days after the agency’s final decision. 
The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal was of the opinion that 
more than one standard should apply.110 For what was termed the 
“jurisdictional question”, the majority held that correctness was the 
appropriate standard. The question was whether the CTA possessed  
the authority to inquire into whether undue obstacles exist when no disabled 
individual had in fact encountered an undue obstacle to mobility. All factors 
of the pragmatic and functional test militated towards less deference 
being shown to the agency. Although there was no privative clause per se, 
the Court of Appeal relied on its past jurisprudence which had held that 
a lower level of deference is necessary for questions coming through the 
statutory right of appeal available for the CTA. The relative expertise of 
the agency was less than that of the Court on this, a question of statutory 
interpretation. Moreover, the provisions of the Canada Transportation Act 
to be interpreted had a human rights aspect which did not fit naturally 
with the agency’s primary function of implementing regulatory provisions. 
Finally, as the nature of the question was statutory interpretation, less 
deference was to be owed. 
With respect to the interpretation of the Canada Transportation Act, 
the question of whether the obstacles were undue and the balancing of 
interests to be done as part of this analysis was held to attract a very 
high level of deference. The Federal Court of Appeal was unanimous 
that the standard of patent unreasonableness should apply. Applying the 
pragmatic and functional approach, the agency was held to have more 
expertise in regulatory matters; the nature of the question was polycentric; 
                                                                                                            
110
 Justice Evans concurred with the majority that the standard of patent unreasonableness 
should apply to the interpretation of the statute. He made no comment on whether a separate 
standard should apply to the question of whether the agency’s jurisdiction was limited to concrete 
fact situations. 
108 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2007), 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
there was a strong privative clause and the questions addressed were of 
mixed fact and law.  
In Via Rail, Abella J., who had asserted her ideas about the dangers 
of courts routinely segmenting administrative tribunal decisions and 
applying different standards of review to their component parts in City 
of Lévis, garnered the support of the majority on this point. Writing on 
behalf of McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Lebel and Charron JJ., Abella J. 
held that the agency’s decision as a whole was most appropriately 
decided on a patent unreasonableness standard. In the majority’s view, 
the issue of whether the agency had the power to determine if an undue 
obstacle existed without an underlying factual basis was not a preliminary 
jurisdictional question falling outside of the agency’s expertise. 
Consequently, Abella J. held that this question should not be subject to a 
different standard of review.  
(a) Commentary 
Justice Abella’s analysis is particularly refreshing in its re-assertion 
of an approach to determining standard of review that privileges 
legislative intent. Justice Abella reasons that labelling as “jurisdictional” 
and subjecting to a correctness standard a decision of an administrative 
body when that decision flows naturally from provisions of its enabling 
statute, will only lead to diminishing the role of tribunals to fact-finding. 
For Abella J., this approach threatens the specialized expertise which is 
foundational to tribunals and to the deference that they are owed.111 In 
this regard, Abella J. cautions that such an approach “has the capacity to 
unravel the essence of the decision and undermine the very characteristic 
of the Agency which entitles it to the highest level of deference from a 
court — its specialized expertise”.112 Adopting such a stance of wide 
curial review also encourages courts to overlook the expertise that a 
tribunal may bring to the exercise of interpreting its enabling legislation 
and defining the scope of its statutory authority.113 
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At the same time, one can foresee difficulties in applying Abella J.’s 
approach. For example, while the approach works very well in situations 
like Via Rail where the human rights related provisions are embedded in 
the enabling statute, it may be more difficult to demonstrate that the 
interpretation of the provisions that are inextricably linked with a 
decision-maker’s decision that stem from a different piece of legislation 
should share the same degree of deference.114 This issue is raised at a 
particularly interesting time in light of the decision of Tranchemontagne115 
discussed earlier. To use Tranchemontagne as an example, the majority 
held that any administrative body should be able to determine if a 
provision of its enabling statute that it is mandated to administer is 
discriminatory under the Ontario Human Rights Code. There will be 
situations similar to Tranchemontagne where this question (whether the 
provision restricting admissibility for social benefits) is intimately linked 
the overall finding of the case (whether benefits should be awarded). 
Should such a question be subject to a correctness standard as a preliminary 
jurisdictional issue or is it so connected to the work of the social benefits 
tribunal in that particular decision that one could argue for integrated 
standard of review? 
As well, there is the more obvious and practical challenge of 
reconciling this case with City of Lévis, decided just the day before Via 
Rail. In City of Lévis, the majority of the Court had supported the use of 
multiple standards of review. Unfortunately, the two decisions do not refer 
to each other, leaving their eventual reconciliation to future case law. 
Undoubtedly, questions surrounding integrated versus multiple 
standards of review and when each one should be applied are certain to 
recur. This issue is also timely as it connects with other questions relating 
to standard review, such as the question raised by Lebel J. in Toronto (City) 
v. C.U.P.E., Local 79116 about whether three standards are necessary or 
whether two will suffice. Like exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction, the 
issue of integrated versus multiple standards of review raises questions 
of the appropriate way to discern and follow legislative intent.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Human rights matters have played a significant role in driving the 
developments in administrative law over the past two terms. By far, 
there was a strong emergence of cases in the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 
terms that touched on the relationship between administrative law and 
human rights principles. As well, questions of exclusive and concurrent 
jurisdiction continued to plague the court. Finally, particularly in the 
2006-2007 term, one saw a stringent debate arise over whether integrated 
or multiple standards of review best served the purpose of pursuing 
legislative intent. 
 
